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The Trump administration has drawn an unflattering spotlight on
what long had been a dormant feature of federalism—there are deep
fissures between the federal government and leading state
governments on questions of foreign policy. The confrontation
between states, led by California, and the United States federal
government regarding climate change policy puts these fissures on full
display.2 California has assumed the mantle of defending the Paris
2. Nadja Popovich, California Is Ready for a Fight Over Tailpipe Emissions. Here’s Why,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/30/climate/californiaauto-emissions.html.
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Agreement on climate change against its express disavowal by the
federal government.3
Initiatives such as these by California and other like-minded states
raise significant constitutional questions. The Supreme Court has
noted that states should not impair the President’s ability to “speak
for the Nation with one voice.”4 But as the headlines proclaim,
California and Washington State Join Carbon Pledge in Defiance of
Trump.5 They have done so, for instance, by joining “five nations on
the Pacific coast of the Americas on Tuesday to agree to step up the
use of a price on carbon dioxide emissions as a central economic
policy to slow climate change.”6 California is acting on its pledge by
implementing state law to that effect.7 California is thus defying
federal foreign policy by entering into its own agreements with
foreign states and implementing its own laws to have an impact on
foreign policy. This is facially difficult to reconcile with the Supreme
Court’s pronouncement on executive foreign affairs powers quoted
above.8
Dean Harold Koh’s recent contribution to the debate about the
foreign policy of the Trump administration sheds further light on the
potential constitutional volatility of California’s conduct.9 Koh notes
that California’s conduct was consistent with how participants in a
transnational legal process would be expected to act and encouraged
California and other states to continue to resist the Trump

3. Evan Halper, A California-led Alliance of Cities and States Vows to Keep the Paris
Climate Accord Intact, L.A. TIMES (June 2, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-polparis-states-2017062-story.html.
4. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000).
5. California and Washington State join Carbon Pledge in Defiance of Trump, REUTERS
(Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-summit-americas/californiaand-washington-state-join-carbon-pledge-in-defiance-of-trump-idUSKBN1E625E.
6. Id.
7. See Tori James, Brown’s Final Budget Emphasizes Signature Efforts, MML NEWS
(June 27, 2018), https://www.mymotherlode.com/news/local/374471/browns-final-budgetemphasizes-signature-efforts.html (“The $1.4 billion Cap and Trade Expenditure Plan
within Brown’s final budget outlines program expenditures to further reduce carbon pollution
and support climate resiliency efforts.”).
8. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381.
9. See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law vs. Donald Trump, A Reply, OPINIO JURIS
(Mar. 5, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/03/05/international-law-vs-donald-trump-a-reply/
(“[O]ther American climate actors—states and localities, private companies and NGOs, the
bureaucracy—should make clear to the international actors seeking to preserve the Paris
accords that Donald Trump does not own the process or speak entirely for America. Norminternalization goes all the way down.”).
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administration.10 Koh first developed the now dominant transnational
legal process theory to explain why states obey international law in
the absence of a global policeman: domestic governmental actors
interact with foreign governments and civil society representatives on
a regular basis; this interaction causes each participant to interpret the
claims made by the other actors by reference to a shared international
legal framework; and this interpretation in turn will lead each side to
internalize the respective norm commitments of the other in domestic
law without need for a global policeman.11 California’s defiance of the
Trump administration, according to Koh, is simply an expression of its
norm internalization of the claims made by the global community
pursuant to the Paris Agreement.12
Koh’s contribution meaningfully moves the ball. It describes why
and how California and other states act in defiance of the President:
they act to protect norms they internalized as transnational legal
process participants.13 This description moves the Californian
experience into a broader legal context beyond the current policy
battles between majority Democratic states and the Trump
administration. In other words, Koh’s rubric gives us the opening not
to ask the politically loaded question: may California defy the Trump
administration? Instead, we can ask: are states constitutionally
permitted to participate in transnational legal processes even when
such participation has the potential to give rise to state laws defying
federal foreign policy?
The answer to this reframed question is far from obvious. The U.S.
Supreme Court in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi held
that “the exercise of the federal executive [foreign affairs] authority
means that state law must give way where, as here, there is evidence of
clear conflict between the policies adopted by the two.”14 This answer
on its face suggests that federal foreign policy can always overrule
state law to the extent that there is “clear conflict between the
policies” in question.15 Such a reading of Garamendi would thus shut
the door on meaningful state participation in transnational legal
10. Id.
11. See Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 194–206 (1996)
[hereinafter Koh TLP] (explaining how the transnational legal process functions).
12. See Harold H. Koh, International Law vs. Donald Trump, A Reply, OPINIO JURIS
(Mar. 5, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/03/05/international-law-vs-donald-trump-a-reply/.
13. See id.
14. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003).
15. See id.
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processes without at least tacit federal approval. It also would mean
that, transnational legal process or not, state attempts to act as a check
on federal foreign policy would be per se unconstitutional.
As discussed in Part I, the foreign affairs law literature submits
that this conclusion is not warranted upon a review of constitutional
jurisprudence as a whole. This literature, led by Jack Goldsmith from
the conservative side and Michael Glennon and Robert Sloane from
the liberal side, suggests that there is significant room for state action
in foreign affairs.16 These scholars each submit further that Supreme
Court jurisprudence is more nuanced than what the traditional soundbites of Presidential exclusivity over foreign affairs would suggest.17
As Part I concludes, however, this literature stands on shaky
grounds precisely in the extreme scenario of state resistance to a
federal foreign policy of defection from an existing global consensus
and towards greater isolation. Goldsmith’s submissions on state
powers stand in the context of an avowedly anti-cosmopolitan
outlook.18 Glennon’s and Sloane’s contribution on state collaboration
with foreign counterparties, on the other hand, is professedly
globalist.19 Both lines of thoughts run to their underlying value
commitments when addressing the question whether states may act as
a globalist champion of last resort to stop federal policies of
isolationism. Constitutional discourse would thus again threaten to
revert to politics.
As Part II articulates, this problem can be avoided by approaching
the question of states’ powers through a lens inspired by transnational
legal process scholarship. This scholarship is instructive because it
provides a more accurate description of state behavior in a globalized
world order compared to the pre-globalization lens of “foreign
affairs” still dominant in the constitutional literature. Thus, the
constitutional literature misses constitutionally critical nuances about
the contemporary regulatory interactions between state and
municipal actors and their foreign counterparts that are the bread and
16. See Jack Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
1617, 1623 (1997); MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FEDERALISM, THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY (2016).
17. See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1623, 1682; GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at
353.
18. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1852 (2009); Jack Goldsmith, Liberal
Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667, 1677–78 (2003).
19. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 229.
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butter of leading descriptive theories such as transnational legal
process and the related global governance network scholarship.
Part II explains that states participate in transnational legal
processes when they join global governance networks. Such networks
form when state legislators and regulators exchange with foreign
counterparts or global civil society actors to discuss joint problems.20
They thus provide fertile ground for transnational legal processes to
take hold in state legislatures and government offices.
Part II then explains how state participation in transnational legal
processes predictably leads to friction between state and federal
actors. Transnational legal process is context dependent: it internalizes
norms in light of a specific context for interaction with foreign
counterparts or a specific network.21 But there are many global
governance networks. These networks naturally resist and compete
with each other for greater influence over policymaking along
predicable lines.22 Knowing the type of actors involved—federal
government actors and state actors in a federal system—it is thus
possible to map where, when, and how this resistance will occur in
light of this competitive dynamic.
Part II contributes to the literature, which currently treats these
conflicts indiscriminately pursuant to the traditional monolithic
“foreign affairs” rubric, by mapping the underlying conflict potential
in five states of resistance, providing practical examples for each. The
first state of resistance arises when state laws seek to prevent a federal
defection from global governance networks. This is the current
California scenario. The second state of resistance arises when state
actors participate on one side of an ongoing network conflict between
different federal constituencies. For example, a state could pass
20. See ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 38 (2004) (discussing the
formation of regulatory networks); Koh TLP, supra note 11, at 194–206 (explaining how the
transnational legal process functions); see also Melissa Waters, Normativity in the “New”
Schools: Assessing the Legitimacy of International Legal Norms Created by Domestic Courts, 32
YALE J. INT’L L. 455, 456 (2007) (noting the common points between these different schools).
For the broader governance literature, see, e.g., EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE passim (2014); Harold H. Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST.
INT’L L. REV. 745, 751 (2006) (linking transnational legal process with global governance); Nico
Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the
International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2006) (“[M]uch of global governance can be
understood as regulation and administration, and that we are witnessing the emergence of a
‘global administrative space . . . .’”).
21. See Koh TLP, supra note 11, at 194–206.
22. See Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1578–79
(2011).
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legislation to bar any affiliate of a company doing business in a
country known for its abysmal human rights record from participation
in state contracts, in conflict with federal free trade policies. In this
context, states act as a catalyst for more definite federal action to
resolve the latent federal policy conflict (e.g., the conflict between
members of the federal government participating in both human
rights and trade networks). The third state of resistance involves the
formation of networks from which federal actors are totally absent,
such as networks forming between sub-national government units
along an international border. In this context, states can meaningfully
advance their own traditional interests by exchanging with foreign
actors on the most effective means to implement these interests into
policy. The fourth state of resistance sees states acting as a drag on
federal policy, particularly in areas of traditional state interests such as
the prosecution of criminal defendants in state court. The fifth state of
resistance, finally, concerns the disagreement between state and
federal officials about how far to promote norm internalization in a
shared network space such as environmental or health law. Each of
these conflicts meaningfully differs from the others. They further
showcase that the current defection scenario is but a small piece to a
larger constitutional puzzle.
So far, scholarship has not answered the crucial question: what is
the constitutional significance of state participation in transnational
legal processes and global governance networks? Part III proposes
that the Compact Clause provides the best constitutional perspective
to understand this state participation in, and resistance through,
global governance networks.23 Part III draws an important
constitutional distinction between state coordination with foreign
actors and state cooperation with foreign actors. It explains that
coordination looks for the immediate achievement by the state of its
regulatory goals by participating in a network. Cooperation, on the
other hand, involves a bargained-for exchange. Part III submits that
under the Compact Clause, states may independently coordinate with
foreign actors through their participation in global governance
networks but must not cooperate with them without federal approval.
In determining whether states had the requisite authority to
coordinate with regard to any specific measure, courts will balance the
link of the state measure to traditional police powers against the

23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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intrusion of the measure upon traditional federal foreign policy
prerogatives.24
Part III advances the literature by showcasing that even cases
criticized by most scholars now fit within a broader transnational
process paradigm.25 This approach is therefore descriptively more
capacious and doctrinally more accurate than the existing
contributions because of its more granular transnational legal process
lens. Part III also shows how this paradigm can explain why trends of
constitutional normalization of foreign affairs law currently coexist
with trends of obvious foreign affairs exceptionalism, thus
underscoring its descriptive appeal.26
Part IV then sets out to remap the states of resistance developed
in Part II over this new rubric. Part IV concludes that state
governments may create any of the states of resistance outlined in
Part II and thus participate as constitutive actors on the global stage
by exercising their state laws or regulations. Part IV also explains that
the federal government is not powerless to exact counter-pressure
and ultimately preempt such state laws or regulations. Part IV will use
the constitutional paradigm developed so far to chart what federal
response will suffice to overcome each state of resistance.
Part V will conclude with an appraisal of why state participation in
global governance networks is in fact desirable. First, it brings
federalist checks and balances to foreign affairs. The Constitution
empowers states to act as a meaningful check on the president in
foreign affairs. But the Article ultimately concludes that the greatest
benefit of state participation is that it acts as a catalyst to apply the
transnational legal process to itself in the other conflict scenarios.
Transnational legal process can create centrifugal forces by driving
policy actors in different administrative departments to enter into
their own competing governance networks. State participation forces
engagement across these networks in fruitful ways. It thus provides a

24. Part III will also defend the balancing approach against the criticism preemptively
raised against such an approach by Glennon and Sloane. See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note
16, at 133–35.
25. See generally Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). For critiques of Zschernig, see,
e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1629; GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 103–21; Ganesh
Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Affairs, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897,
1918 (2015).
26. See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1918; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack Goldsmith,
Presidential Control Over International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1263 (2018).
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previously un-theorized means to integrate the value commitments
propagated in nearly all transnational legal processes with each other.
I. STATES, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. The Commonplace View: National Exclusivity
Most lawyers have two preconceptions about the constitutional
assignment of foreign affairs powers. First, states have no business
participating in foreign affairs.27 Second, the Constitution reserves
foreign affairs powers to the President.28 This commonplace
understanding finds its doctrinal home in the “dormant foreign affairs
clause.”29
The Constitution lends some textual support to the first
proposition that the federal government alone holds foreign affairs
powers. Article I, section 10 of the Constitution provides that “No
State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.”30 It
continues that states also are prohibited to “grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal.”31
Article I, section 10 second addresses the question of import
duties—a critical question on the control of foreign trade at the time
of the drafting of the constitution.32 Article I, section 10 makes clear
that the overall supremacy on questions of import duties lies with
Congress and that states may act only with Congressional
acquiescence.33 To remove further temptations of state adventurism,
Article I, section 10 provides that “the net Produce of all Duties and
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use

27. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) (“That kind of state involvement in
foreign affairs and international relations—matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the
Federal Government—is not sanctioned by Clark v. Allen.”); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540,
572 (1840) (the Framers “anxiously desired to cut off all connection or communication between
a state and a foreign power . . . .”).
28. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003) (the “President [is] to speak
for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments . . . .”).
29. See Garrick Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L.J. 500, 500, 552–61 (2012) (theorizing
dormant foreign affairs through the lens of a state preclusion thesis that “[s]tate governments
may not take actions that undermine the constitutionally established structure of government of
which they are a part.”).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
31. Id.
32. See G. Edward White, The Political Economy of the Original Constitution, 35 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 71–75 (2012) (discussing the political background of the imports and
exports duties provision in Article I).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
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of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject
to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.”34
Article I, section 10 further lays out that states also do not have
powers to conduct war, save in extreme cases.35 This reserves again
one of the key foreign affairs powers—the power to wage war to
vindicate international rights—with the federal government.36
Finally, the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause is explicit that treaty
commitments of the United States displace the constitution and laws
of the several states.37 It thus again provides support for a broader
proposition of federal foreign affairs supremacy over the states.38
The Constitution on its face is less supportive of the second
commonplace preconception that the executive is vested with
supreme foreign affairs powers.39 It provides in Article II, section 2
only that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls.”40 Nevertheless, from at least the 1790s,
the initiative in foreign affairs was vested in the Presidency.41 This
initiative was, however, subject to Congressional oversight.42
As recent literature has demonstrated, the commonplace
understanding of federal exclusivity in the context of foreign affairs
on closer inspection greatly oversimplifies the federalist architecture
of the Constitution.43 To begin with, the constitutional text does not
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
36. See OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW
WAR REMADE THE WORLD 96 (2017) (discussing the role of war in international law at the
time of the nation’s founding).
37. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
38. See Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and NonSelf-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1587 (2003) (“The Supremacy Clause makes clear that
treaties can override inconsistent state law . . . .”).
39. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 707
(2000) (“The conventional view is that deference to the executive branch concerning the
meaning of customary international law is covered by essentially the same rule governing
treaties: Courts are to give substantial weight to the executive branch’s interpretation so that the
United States generally will speak with one voice in foreign affairs.”).
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
41. Frederic G. Sourgens, The Paris Paradigm, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming June
2019), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3125923.
42. See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1682–83.
43. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 353 (arguing that the Constitution “permit[s]
states to act unless Congress has clearly prohibited them from doing so”); see Jack Goldsmith,
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completely displace state powers to conduct foreign affairs.44 It
creates a space for coexistence between the states and the federal
government. On its face, so long as Congress does not object and so
long as it does not conflict with the foreign policy of the United States,
there is little that would prevent the states from engaging in foreign
policy of their own.45 In fact, states are reasonably active in
communicating with foreign governments with regard to issues that
affect their respective economic interests.46 State trade missions
abroad to woo investments are one such frequent example.47
Further, the impact of state conduct on foreign affairs does not
automatically give the federal government a right to preempt the
execution of state laws. Thus, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in several cases held that the murder convictions of defendants in
state court violated international law requirements of consular
notification.48 The International Court of Justice further ordered the
United States to halt the executions.49
The issue had significant foreign policy implications as the United
States had a treaty obligation to comply with the ICJ’s decision.50
Texas and other states refused to heed the decision by the
International Court of Justice or a request by President Bush to halt
the execution in question, forcing litigation on the issue of whether

Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1682–83 (1997)
(discussing the current view that Congress must act to preempt state conduct internationally).
44. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 20 (pointing out that no constitutional
provision exists vesting exclusive foreign affairs powers in the federal government).
45. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 353 (arguing that the Constitution “permit[s]
states to act unless Congress has clearly prohibited them from doing so”); Goldsmith, supra note
16, at 1682–83 (discussing the current view that Congress must act to preempt state conduct
internationally).
46. See Section II.B.
47. See, e.g., Trade Missions, Cal. Gov. Office of Bus. & Econ. Dev.,
http://www.business.ca.gov/Programs/International-Affairs-and-Business-Development/
International-Trade-Promotion/Trade-Missions (last visited June 1, 2018) (summarizing
California’s foreign trade missions); Trade Missions, Empire St. Dev., https://esd.ny.gov/
international/trademissions.html (last visited June 1, 2018) (summarizing New York’s foreign
trade missions); Christopher Fryer, Bevin Takes Kentucky Delegation to Asia for Trade Mission,
LOUISVILLE BUS. FIRST (May 17, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/louisville/news/2018/05/17/
bevin-takes-kentucky-delegation-to-asia-for-trade.html (reporting on recent Kentucky trade
mission to Asia).
48. See Bruno Simma & Carsten Hoppe, From Lagrand and Avena to Medellin – A Rocky
Road Towards Implementation, 14 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7 (2005) (discussing the cases in
question).
49. See id. at 22–26.
50. See id.
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the executions could proceed.51 The issue ultimately reached the U.S.
Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas; the Court sided with Texas.52 The
lead complainant in the Supreme Court case, José Medellin, was
executed shortly after the decision was rendered.53 Plainly, the
invocation of foreign affairs powers by the federal government had
little impact even in a case of clear conflict between the federal
foreign policy to abide by the ICJ’s judgment and state law requiring
the execution of the criminal defendant in violation of that
judgment.54 These gaps in the commonplace understanding of foreign
affairs powers showcase that the relationship between the states and
the federal government are more nuanced than might at first appear.
B. The Current Paradigm: Co-operation and National Supremacy
1. Rebuffing Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption
Jack Goldsmith’s 1997 article Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs and
Federalism revolutionized the current debate on the role of states in
foreign affairs and began to point out the gaps in the commonplace
understanding outlined above.55 Goldsmith’s core submission is that
globalization has washed away the distinction between “traditional
areas” of foreign relations and more traditional areas of domestic
policy.56 This shift, in turn, necessitates a reappraisal of classical
foreign relations jurisprudence appearing to prohibit state action in
foreign affairs reached against this more traditional background
condition.57 This new state of affairs could certainly lead to conflict
between the states and the federal government on questions that
51. See id. at 26–56 (discussing the various leading decisions prior to the Medellin U.S.
Supreme Court decision).
52. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525–32 (2008) (holding that the treaty obligations
would only preempt state convictions if the treaties in question were self-executing and holding
that they were not).
53. Allan Turner, Medellin Executed for Rape, Murder of Houston Teens, HOUS. CHRON.
(Aug. 5, 2008), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Medellin-executed-for-rapemurder-of-Houston-1770696.php.
54. For a discussion of Medellin, see, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1263
(2018); GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 239–43; Oona A. Hathaway et al., International
Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 70–76 (2012).
55. See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1671. For the continued relevance of Goldsmith’s
article and discussions agreeing with its principal points, see, e.g., GLENNON & SLOANE, supra
note 16, at 353; Sirataman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1918; Edward L. Rubin, The Role of
Federalism in International Law, 40 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 195, 198 (2017).
56. Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1671.
57. See id. (globalization “reflect[s] a significant increase in international cooperation,
coordination, and regulation that has blurred the distinction between foreign and domestic
relations along several axes. ”).
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involve foreign relations. But Goldsmith’s overarching assertion is
that:
[t]he presence of such externalities does not, by itself, justify
federal judicial lawmaking. In the absence of a serious breakdown
in the political process, our constitutional democracy normally
depends on the elected federal political branches to correct this
sort of problem. Political instead of judicial federalization is
especially warranted here since the values to be attached to the
competing federalism and foreign relations interests appear
increasingly contested.58

Goldsmith argues that Congress retains the ability to preempt
state law directly, should it wish to do so.59 Noting that Congress lacks
the institutional capability to address many foreign affairs matters
promptly, Goldsmith further submits that the executive can act within
its own foreign affairs powers or delegated powers to preempt state
law when it deems that this is necessary.60
Goldsmith’s argument is deeply critical of Supreme Court
decisions that purported to carve out broad foreign affairs powers
exclusively for the federal government. The principal such case is the
1968 decision in Zschernig v. Miller.61 In Zschernig, the Supreme
Court invalidated an Oregon inheritance law requiring that foreign
nationals could inherit property from an Oregon estate only to the
extent that the foreign national’s home law would guarantee that the
national would have a right to hold that property.62 The law was
implicitly anti-communist, as it required foreign jurisdictions to
recognize a right to private property for their nationals to qualify as
heirs in Oregon.63 The Court ruled that the law unduly impinged on
federal foreign affairs powers.64

58. Id. at 1679.
59. Id. at 1681–83.
60. See id. at 1684 (“When the executive branch identifies harmful state foreign relations
activity, it is much better positioned than Congress to address it. Foreign relations is (and is
perceived to be) the President’s responsibility. He is thus more accountable for foreign relations
problems than Congress, and has a greater interest in redressing state-created foreign relations
difficulties.”).
61. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
62. Id. at 440.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 441 (“The Oregon law does, indeed, illustrate the dangers which are involved if
each State, speaking through its probate courts, is permitted to establish its own foreign
policy.”).
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For Goldsmith, the Zschernig Court sought to resolve a problem
that did not exist.65 The federal executive had submitted an amicus
brief in which it confirmed that the Oregon law had not “unduly
interfered” with federal foreign policy interests.66 Congress had not
acted to preempt the law, nor was there a treaty in place that would
have impeded the law’s application.67 The decision thus epitomized
judicial overreach in arrogating to the courts the power to conduct an
“independent assessment of the foreign relations consequences of
applying state law.”68 And it did so without textual, historical, or
functional support.69
Goldsmith’s inversion of our commonplace understanding—and
of Zschernig—has become the new normal. In one of the seminal
studies on state foreign affairs powers, Glennon and Sloane conclude
that courts should “except in extraordinary circumstances, permit the
states to act unless Congress has clearly prohibited them from doing
so.”70 Glennon and Sloane follow closely along a similar logical path
to Goldsmith in criticizing dormant foreign affairs preemption.71
Others have argued along similar lines that there is simply no textual
or functional basis to continue to imply a dormant foreign affairs
power in the federal government.72
2. Limiting Dormant Foreign Commerce Preemption
Glennon and Sloane in particular pushed back further against
another kind of dormancy doctrine with relevance to foreign affairs:
the dormant foreign commerce clause. The dormant foreign
commerce doctrine arises out of the commerce clause in Article I,
section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution, which provides that Congress

65. See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1629.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 1698 (“Many of the just-identified problems of a federal common law of
foreign relations—disincentives for political branch action in this context, decentralization of
the federal foreign relations lawmaking process, and nonuniformity of federal foreign relations
law—are thus not present in a world governed by state law in the absence of a controlling
federal enactment.”).
70. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 353.
71. Id. at 129–45.
72. See, e.g., David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 967 (2014)
(noting the jurisprudential shift away from Zschernig preemption); Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra
note 25, at 1979 (“In the decades since the end of the Cold War, however, the Court has said a
great deal about foreign affairs. Perhaps surprisingly, most of what it has said is that foreign
relations law is not so exceptional after all. Scholars too have come to the same conclusion.”).
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shall have the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States.”73 The dormant foreign commerce
clause has the potential effect to create a new dormant foreign affairs
clause because “cars, locomotives, refrigerators, clocks, pens, aircraft
engines, and so—all go through a serpentine international odyssey.”74
Exclusive authority to regulate such broad global commerce would
come to the same result as the authority to regulate all of foreign
affairs.
Glennon and Sloane push back against such an expansive reading
of the dormant foreign commerce clause. They note the clause’s close
textual relation to the interstate commerce clause. They conclude that
structurally and functionally, there is nothing inherently different
about global trade compared to interstate trade and that the same
two-factor test governing the dormant interstate-commerce clause
should also govern the dormant foreign commerce clause: first,
discrimination against interstate state commerce is per se invalid;
second, nondiscriminatory regulations are invalid if “the burden
imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to local
benefits.”75 This limitation significantly restricts any dormant foreign
affairs preemptive effect of the clause.
3. Remaining Disagreement: State Autonomy vs. Global
Cooperation
The literature on its face agrees in its rejection of broad dormant
foreign affairs or broad dormant foreign commerce clause
preemption, thus carving out an apparent consensus on the
permissibility of state action in foreign affairs. This facial agreement is,
however, potentially misleading. Scholars such as Goldsmith on the
one end and Glennon and Sloane on the other end may well agree
that states have a broader freedom from federal constraint. But their
normative starting points are meaningfully different in ways that have
profound practical implications.
Thus, much of what animates Goldsmith in rejecting broad
“common law” doctrines preempting state conduct affecting foreign
affairs is a concern for democratic autonomy.76 Goldsmith’s distrust of

73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
74. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 149.
75. Id. at 171, 178. The only additional factors jurisprudence has recognized beyond these
two classic interstate tests concern tax measures. Id. at 171.
76. Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1631 (discussing the concept of judge-made foreign
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this “common law of foreign affairs” is that it is not checked by
democratic political processes.77 These democratic political processes,
he notes, in turn do suffice to check aberrant state behavior that truly
interferes with federal foreign policy.78
Goldsmith’s scholarship and the work of other like-minded
scholars places this autonomy in juxtaposition to broader cooperative
international norms.79 In the first instance, Goldsmith’s project of
critiquing a foreign affairs “common law” not only wishes to create
broader leeway for action for the states.80 It is married with a related
project to attack the inclusion of the world’s common law—that is,
customary international law—in federal common law, as well.81
Both attacks, the attack on federal foreign affairs “common law”
and the attack on the inclusion of customary international law in
federal common law, are motivated by the value of democratic
relations common law); Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 18, at 1852 (“One important reason
why democratic states do not engage in more cosmopolitan action is because the citizens and
elected officials in those states do not support it. This is not just a practical constraint on the
realization of moral good but also, for many, a competing moral imperative, grounded in the
moral claims of democratic self-government.”).
77. Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1623 (“The federal political branches are much better at
redressing state intrusions on federal foreign relations prerogatives, and the federal courts much
worse, than is commonly thought. Thus, there is little need for a federal common law of foreign
relations, and good reason to believe that federal courts do not develop this law in a fashion that
achieves its stated goals.”); id. at 1668 (“But even if they had access to the information
possessed by the political branches and even if foreign relations training were a prerequisite to
judicial service, they still would not be well-suited to make such determinations. Judges lack
national political accountability.”).
78. Id. at 1623.
79. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 18, at 1852 (“In moral theory and international
law alike, there is no easy escape from the challenge of reconciling normative constraints and
demands on the state with the traditional claims of state sovereignty and self-determination.”).
80. See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1681–83.
81. See Curtis Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 861–62 (1997)
(linking the rejection of customary international law as federal common law directly to
federalism concerns); Jack L. Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal
Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673, 708 (1998) (“Erie’s constitutional holding says that state or
federal law must supply the authorization for federal courts to apply customary international
law.”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Curtis Bradley, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of
International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260, 2264 (1998) (noting that the customary
international law applied by federal courts following Filartiga “differed in crucial respects from
the CIL applied in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” by including human rights
norms inconsistent with Erie); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the
Resemblance between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L.
639, 672 (2000) (“Modern CIL is mostly aspirational, just as old CIL was. With old and new CIL
alike, nations mouth their agreement to popular ideals as long as there is no cost in doing so, but
abandon their commitments as soon as there is a pressing military or economic or domestic
reason to do so.”).
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political accountability—or “democratic self-determination.”82 When
federal courts act to preempt state conduct on the grounds of foreign
affairs “common law” doctrines, unelected judges override the
promulgation of elected state executives and legislatures.83 When
federal courts rule on the basis of customary international law, they
impose norms on the nation that are not derived from any national
popular will but rather emanate from an amorphous world
community without any legislative imprimatur.84
The point of this line of scholarship therefore is to provide
freedom for the states to act autonomously to represent the distinct
wishes of their constituencies. It rejects foreign affairs
exceptionalism—the notion that foreign affairs are a special sphere of
extra-constitutional federal power—in favor of a form of American
exceptionalism.85
Glennon and Sloane, on the other hand, are concerned with
increasing global cooperation.86 In rejecting federal preemption, they
wish to make space for collaborative, cosmopolitan efforts by states
and civil society at large.87 They see states as a key actor in regulating
globalization. But, unlike Goldsmith, they embrace the globalization
premise that greater social and economic interconnection can only be
guided and tamed by greater legal interconnection.88
When placed in the broader framework of Sloane’s scholarship,
and the frame of his jurisprudential outlook, state participation in
foreign affairs captures important social policy processes.89 This
project begins from the assumption that there exists a normatively
82. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional
Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1845 (2009) (“If classical state sovereignty is on its
way to obsolescence, democratic self-determination stands ready to take its place.”).
83. See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1668.
84. See Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1712–13; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 81.
85. See Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1667, 1677–78 (2003) (noting that cosmopolitan actions by the United States are obviated by
democratic constraints).
86. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 38–39 (noting state action in the face of federal
paralysis through cooperation on standards and best practices).
87. Id. at 299 (“[L]ocal actors at the state and municipal levels took the initiative to
advance values (e.g., political reform in Burma, international human rights protection) that
might otherwise have been marginalized.”).
88. Compare id. (outlining cosmopolitan value of state action) with Goldsmith, supra note
85, at 1677–78 (noting that cosmopolitan actions by the United States are obviated by
democratic constraints).
89. See Robert D. Sloane, More Than What Courts Do: Jurisprudence, Decision, and
Dignity – In Brief Encounters in Global Affairs, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 517, 522 (2009) (discussing
the importance of diverse constitutive actors in legal processes).
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(and legally) relevant world society and that domestic legal processes
simply reflect and participate in these global legal processes.90 It thus
rejects as jejune the notion that Rousseauian communal sovereignty
somehow suffices to isolate any one society from the world “out
there.”91
This scholarship’s goal is in many ways the opposite of
Goldsmith’s. It wants to increase the autonomy of states by permitting
them to cooperate more fully with the world community.92 The distinct
wishes of constituencies are meaningful because they engage with and
participate in world social process beyond their own town and state
limits.93 It rejects foreign affairs exceptionalism and American
exceptionalism in order to preserve American leadership in tackling
pressing world problems.94
This difference in normative outlook has important practical
consequences. Most starkly, and as is most immediately intuitive, both
lines of scholarship disagree with each other on whether customary
international law preempts contrary state law. Customary
international law still provides a good part of the scaffolding for
international legal cooperation to take place.95 Consequently,
Glennon and Sloane as a matter of outlook reject the hypothesis that
violations of customary international law should be permissible—and
provide a well-founded historical analysis to support their point of
view that customary international law (the law of nations) was always
intended to be part of the Supremacy Clause as federal common law.96
The Goldsmithian line of scholarship, as discussed above, rejects this
submission on Erie and implicit state sovereignty grounds.97
90. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 38 (“[S]ocial and economic problems can be
addressed effectively only through cross-border collaboration – necessitating cooperative
arrangements between states and foreign states.”).
91. Compare id. at 9 (“[T]his vision of republicanism, however, as Rousseau’s Social
Contract made clear, could not work in the absence of a relatively homogenous small polity. For
civic virtue to flourish in any polity, citizens must share common values and interests and their
personal desires must remain consistent with the general will.”) with Goldsmith, supra note 85,
at 1677–78 (2003) (noting that cosmopolitan actions by the United States are obviated by
democratic constraints).
92. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 38.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 299.
95. See Laurence R. Helfer & Ingrid B. Wuerth, Customary International Law: An
Instrument Choice Perspective, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 563, 609 (2016) (arguing that states will
continue to choose customary international law despite the rise in codified legal instruments and
soft law).
96. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 253–72.
97. See sources cited supra note 81.
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This difference in normative outlook also matters in the context of
traditional states’ rights discourses. The Goldsmithian line of
argument finds a natural jurisprudential ally in “states’ rights” —and
traditional areas of state competence. These doctrines have been used
as a rhetorical and legal bulwark in a context that rarely connoted
greater national or global inclusion or cooperation.98 To the contrary,
they have been used to defend local prescriptions against the external
on a normative foundation that is premised precisely upon the
superior normative force of the local, Rousseauian community.99 This
states’ rights outlook allows Goldsmith to defend decisions such as
Medellin, which refused to apply international legal obligations on the
states even when the United States had, through its political process,
ratified core treaties at stake in the dispute (the U.N. Charter and the
Vienna Convention on the Consular Relations) on the ground that
these treaties were not self-executing.100
Glennon and Sloane’s global outlook instead responds to Medellin
by noting that it is a “recent concrete example of state or local
foreign-policy initiatives that have clearly and significantly damaged
the nation as a whole.”101 It bristles at the notion of using traditional
state areas of competence as a test to limit the foreign affairs powers
of the federal government.102 States’ rights and states’ powers, in other
words, are a political lightning rod separating both schools of thought,

98. See Jane Dailey, Race, Marriage, and Sovereignty in the New World Order, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 511, 533 (2009) (“[B]y 1950 . . . the argument
that international human rights norms might trump discriminatory local practices had outpaced
the domestic political will to support those rights and had, instead, inspired strenuous
resistance—as demonstrated by the Bricker Amendment and a mounting rhetoric of
local sovereignty/’states’s rights’.”); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in
the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 354 (2008) (noting the traditionally conservative rhetoric
of judicial restraint, originalism, and states’ rights).
99. See H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated
Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285, 1303 (1985) (noting the historical precedent that
“states’ rights theorists attempted to avoid the anti-majoritarian implications of their stand by
contending that the relevant majority was the majority within each individual state; they
supported this assertion with the claim that the states as bodies politic had preceded and created
the Union.”).
100. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1263 (describing the Medellin Court’s
rejection of an executive branch effort to preempt state law); see also Medellin v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 511, 514 (2008). For an interesting discussion linking Medellin to the current
immigration federalism debate, see David S. Rubenstein, Black-Box Immigration Federalism,
114 MICH. L. REV. 983, 996 (2016).
101. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 142–44.
102. Id.
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despite their facial agreement on the broader role of states in foreign
affairs.103
C. The Conflict Problem: American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi
The ideological disagreement between the Goldsmithian and
Glennon-Sloane conceptions of state participation in foreign affairs
comes to a head when there are instances of outright conflict between
the federal government and the state governments on questions of
foreign policy. Again, both conceptions would carefully seek to avoid
conflict by parsing disagreements as permitting states to continue to
have a seat at the table because federal policy has not been
sufficiently clearly articulated—or not articulated by the right actor.
But both conceptions would part ways when this avoidance is no
longer possible because there is a bona fide conflict between state and
federal foreign policy prerogatives. That scenario would force the
values motivating their respective positions to come to the fore.
The U.S. Supreme Court first teed up this problem in American
Insurance Association v. Garamendi104 in 2003. Garamendi involved
Californian legislation requiring insurance companies doing business
in California to disclose all policies sold to persons in Europe between
1920 and 1945, as well as the status of those policies, to assist
California residents to collect on Holocaust-era claims.105 The
potential for conflict arose because the federal executive had entered
into an executive agreement, the German Foundation Agreement, to
set up a process for the resolution of claims arising against German
nationals from the National Socialist era.106 The executive agreement
provided that the parties wished to create an exclusive forum and that
the federal government would appear in court proceedings involving
claims covered by the German Foundation Agreement to submit that:

103. At the same time, however, there are other contexts in which even Glennon and
Sloane look to traditional state competencies as a source of power, namely in the context of
permissible cooperation by states through foreign state compacts. Id. at 289 (“[A] focus on
traditional state functions may well hold out the promise of a more coherent legal standard for
assessing Compact Clause issues in the domain of foreign affairs.”). In other words, Glennon
and Sloane wish to preserve states’ rights to cooperate without necessarily advocating for state
rights, tout court.
104. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
105. See id. at 409 (describing the nature of the California legislation); id. at 402.
106. See id. at 405 (describing the executive agreement).
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the President of the United States has concluded that it would be
in the foreign policy interests of the United States for the
[German] Foundation to be the exclusive forum and remedy for
the resolution of all asserted claims against German companies
arising from their involvement in the National Socialist era and
World War II.107

As Justice Ginsburg observed in her dissenting opinion, however,
the German Foundation Agreement was careful to point out that
“[t]he United States does not suggest that its policy interests
concerning the Foundation in themselves provide an independent
legal basis for dismissal.”108 The Supreme Court nevertheless struck
down the California law because of a conflict between federal foreign
policy (rather than federal law) and California state law.109
In the first instance, the Glennon-Sloane view on its face seeks to
show that this was not an instance of conflict between federal policy
and state law.110 The federal government took pains to avoid such a
conflict.111 The judiciary therefore should not have created one where
the political branches carefully sought to circumnavigate it.112 This
argument is reminiscent of Goldsmith’s critique of Zschernig,
authored before Garamendi was decided.113
A more careful analysis, however, begins to show cracks in this
avoidance strategy. Thus, Glennon and Sloane point out that federal
policy should not preempt state law because policy is not law.114 This
betrays a cooperative bent: federal policy would only ever ripen into
law (treaty, sole executive agreement, congressional executive
agreement, etc.) if the federal government sought to cooperate with
another foreign counterparty.115

107. Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility, and the
Future”, U.S.-Ger., July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298, 1303.
108. 539 U.S. at 436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1304).
109. See id. at 429 (holding that even though Congress had not acted, the President had
independent authority in foreign policy and California’s efforts impeded federal policy).
110. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 128.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1629.
114. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 137.
115. See id. at 136 (“[T]he federal government has the constitutional power to preempt
state law affirmatively under the Supremacy Clause; if it exercises that power, then, even if the
state measures taken to advance the shared foreign policy goal prove far more effective than
federal measures, state law must give way.”).
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The exit from treaties, sole executive agreements, or congressional
executive agreements is a federal policy that does not make law.116 It
is a policy that on its face removes federal law.117 The complaint that
such policy should not be allowed to preempt state law purely
because it is policy rather than law rings hollow. It begs the question
whether the policy of withdrawal of law (and thus withdrawal of
regulation) should be given force and, if so, what force. Garamendi
would suggest that it should receive some force.118 Glennon and
Sloane, predictably given their value commitments to cooperation,
disagree.119
The issue does not become easier from the Goldsmithian
perspective. The removal of federal law on its face should remove
obstacles for state action.120 But what if the state action in question
seeks to recreate the cooperative structures from which the federal
government sought to withdraw? And, what is more, what if the state
doing so has sufficient economic clout to drive or, at the very least, to
influence the national market? In that instance, should the absence of
federal law mean that states should not be allowed to step into the
void to cooperate in the federal government’s stead? The value
commitments of the Goldsmithian perspective would certainly
suggest as much. In fact, Goldsmith has argued against more global
cooperation without clearer Congressional approval, submitting
instead that such cooperative opportunities should be delegated to
the states.121
This value commitment thus easily could make use of legal
strategies that require Congressional approval for any cooperation,

116. See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers, 53 VA. J.
INT’L L. 247, 267 (2013) (discussing treaty termination in the context of the Supremacy Clause).
117. See Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential Power to Terminate International Agreements,
128 YALE L.J. FORUM 432, 454 (2018) (“U.S. withdrawal from a long-standing treaty or
international organization . . . should not become effective without congressional involvement.
Such a withdrawal or termination would similarly necessitate unwinding many domestic law
statutes that the executive could not repeal alone.”)
118. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 423–24 (2003) (discussing the broad
discretion that the President has in furthering national policy through economic pressure).
119. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 136.
120. Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1664–65 (arguing that in the absence of federal law, state
law should control).
121. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1254 (“Presidential termination or
disavowal of international obligations might also negatively impact states. For example, the
Trump Administration’s effort to pull back from commitments made by the Obama
Administration to address climate change could have long-term economic and other effects on
U.S. states, especially along the coastlines.”).
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including state cooperation, through the Compact Clause. The
Compact Clause, discussed in detail below, provides that no state shall
“without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement
or Compact with another State, or foreign Power.”122
In a recent article, David Sloss has cautiously noted the potential
for such an approach to foreign state compacts.123 Sloss’s article
focused on an agreement between California and Quebec providing
for a joint cap and trade emissions regime to combat climate
change.124 Sloss follows in broad outline the analysis of scholars like
Glennon and Sloane in that he, too, deems that most such agreements
do not require explicit Congressional authorization.125
But Sloss focuses upon a prong in interstate compact clause
litigation that did not receive similar attention from more
cooperation-minded scholars: can the state withdraw from an
arrangement at its discretion?126 Noting the importance of withdrawal
rights in the interstate compact context, Sloss submits that foreign
state agreements that do not provide for similar means of
discretionary exit would require Congressional approval127—
essentially because such prospective promises not to withdraw are
beyond the power of the state to make in its ordinary legislative
process. Because California bound itself not to withdraw at will, Sloss
concludes that the agreement with Quebec might well violate the
Compact Clause absent Congressional approval.128
This argument, in other words, may allow a doctrinal exit for
scholars with strong anti-cosmopolitan value commitments to escape
from their broader commitment to increased state participation in
foreign affairs when federal policy has been to withdraw from
international agreements and cooperative structures. Rather than

122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
123. See generally David Sloss, California’s Climate Diplomacy and Dormant Preemption,
56 WASHBURN L.J. 507 (2017). Sloss did not endorse the position fully as his own but noted it as
significant doctrinal problem.
124. See id. at 508 (describing the agreement between California and Quebec).
125. Id. at 521–22 (arguing that the agreement between California and Quebec does not
violate the Compact Clause, even without Congressional approval).
126. See id. at 524–26 (explaining the requirement that a state have unilateral power to
withdraw from agreement to avoid triggering the Compact Clause).
127. Id. at 524–25.
128. Id. (“If California does not obtain congressional consent for the [agreement with
Quebec], a court might hold that the Agreement violates the Compact Clause.”).
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embrace state action, this strategy would vindicate the value of
Congress as ultimate guardian of democratic self-determination.129
D. Reframing the Garamendi Discussion
The above discussion has shown that the literature’s openness to
greater state participation in foreign affairs hits an impasse precisely
in the current confrontation between the Trump administration and
states like California over the Paris Agreement on climate change.130
It thus cannot so far resolve the potential inconsistency between
Garamendi and Dean Koh’s analysis that California’s actions were a
direct result of its participation in the transnational legal process. Koh
submits that “states and localities . . . should make clear to the
international actors seeking to preserve the Paris accords that Donald
Trump does not own the process or speak entirely for America.”131
Garamendi cautions that “[t]he exercise of the federal executive
authority means that state law must give way where, as here, there is
evidence of clear conflict between the policies adopted by the two.”132
As discussed in the previous section, the literature so far has not
found a coherent answer as to how far or on what basis states could
actively resist the express foreign policy of retreat from international
commitments, ostensibly creating policy space for state action, as
opposed to the affirmative conclusion of international treaties or
executive agreements narrowing this space, as was the case in
Garamendi.133
Helpfully, Koh’s call to action rests upon a conceptual framework
that can assist in reframing this conflict problem encountered in the
foreign affairs literature.134 Koh’s appeal relies upon an extension of
his transnational legal process theory. Transnational legal process
theory submits that states comply with international legal obligations
and act cooperatively on the international stage because they
internalize norms.135 This internalization occurs after a three-step
129. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1254 (explaining that Congress’ Article I
powers allow it to override presidential actions).
130. See Popovich, supra note 2. (describing the conflict between California and the Trump
administration).
131. Koh, supra note 9.
132. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003).
133. Id. at 416 (“Generally, then, valid executive agreements are fit to preempt state law,
just as treaties are.”).
134. See generally Koh, supra note 9.
135. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2602 (1996) (positing that global norms are ultimately internalized by domestic legal
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process. First, participants in a process must interact with each
other.136 Second, they interpret the statements made by other process
participants with whom they interact in light of their own frame of
reference.137 Third, they internalize the commitments of other process
participants in light of their own interpretive framework.138
In simple terms, transnational legal process works like our
proverbial “common sense.” Routine observation of any daily scene
will confirm that human beings are not born with common sense.
Rather, they learn it through observation and engagement (and some
trial and error). When one has learned a “common-sense rule” (say,
“don’t drive drunk! You will get in an accident!”), one follows this
rule because one agrees with it and has made it part and parcel of
one’s own normative expectations how people should conduct
themselves in the world. We no longer follow the rule “don’t drive
drunk” because our mother told us not to do it. We follow it because
we firmly believe it to be in our own best interest to follow the rule.
Dean Koh’s point about state action in defiance of President
Trump’s exit from the Paris Agreement is that “[n]orm-internalization
goes all the way down.”139 Not only does the federal bureaucracy,
starting with the state department and going through to every other
leading federal department, internalize international legal norms.140
Other actors, too, are exposed to the transnational legal process
through their participation in global governance networks, discussed
more fully in the next section.141 These actors relevantly include state
actors.142
Because of their participation in global governance networks, and
their interaction with foreign governments, these state actors have
come to internalize international norms and want to comply with

systems).
136. See id. at 2618 (through an interactive process, “law helps translate claims of legal
authority into national behavior.”).
137. See id. at 2634 (arguing that in order to understand why nations obey international law,
one must account for the importance of the interpretation of legal norms).
138. See id. (contending that in order to understand why nations obey international law,
one must account for the importance of domestic internalization of international norms).
139. Koh, supra note 9.
140. See id. (asserting that government actors have been forced to internalize international
legal norms).
141. See id. (discussing the fact that actors outside of the federal government internalize
international legal norms).
142. See id. (including states as actors outside of the federal government that internalize
international legal norms).
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these norms.143 And they will want to comply with an international
norm precisely when they see that the federal government is acting in
violation of what they consider to be a common-sense way to conduct
oneself in the world. In our common-sense example, the need to act is
particularly great when one is in a car with a driver whom one
discovers to be drunk only after merging (or swerving) onto a busy
highway; in that scenario, one might go to great lengths to make sure
that the driver pulls the car over to the side of the highway and gets
away from the steering wheel.
Transnational legal process thus inherently creates a potential for
conflict between the state and federal governments. It creates the
kinds of incentives for state actors to want to act when, to their minds,
the federal government is violating basic international norms that
they have since internalized as basic common sense.144
Koh’s theory, as well as his call to action, thus conceives of states
as an active check on federal foreign policy. This theory—and call to
action—thus sits precisely in the most controversial zone of the
foreign affairs powers after Garamendi.145 And it sits in a zone that is
not yet fully theorized in the literature.146
But it also provides a starting point for resolving this controversy.
The potential for conflict arises because of state participation in
global governance networks in which states interact with the
transnational legal process. Logically, the conflict is but a symptom of
this participation. Thus, if state participation in global governance
networks is permissible, the result of this participation by logical
extension is also presumptively constitutionally permissible. This
frame thus moves from an analysis of symptoms (conflict between
state law and federal foreign policy) to causes and can therefore help
to resolve precisely the questions posed by the literature—and resolve
them in a manner that is reasonably detached from specific policy
results, making continued agreement between scholars from different
ends of the political spectrum more probable and the resulting
proposal more doctrinally sound in the process. The remainder of the
143. See id. (pointing out that many states and their citizens want to comply with the Paris
Climate Accords).
144. See id. (describing the fact that citizens of states may understand the effects of climate
change even though the federal government is not complying with the related international
norms).
145. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) (holding that the exercise of
federal executive authority requires state law to give way when there is conflict).
146. See Section I.C.
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Article will therefore focus on the question through this reframed
perspective.
II. THE REACH OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE NETWORKS “ALL THE
WAY DOWN”
A. Transnational Legal Process and Global Governance Networks
The question presented by Dean Koh’s paradigm shift away from
classic foreign affairs rubrics towards transnational legal process is
whether states may constitutionally participate in transnational legal
processes. This section outlines that states participate in transnational
legal processes by joining global governance networks. It first
introduces the concept of global governance networks and then
explains the relationship between global governance networks and
transnational legal process.
1. Global Governance Networks
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter has exhaustively theorized how
global governance networks function.147 Slaughter submits that
networks exist on a sliding scale from purely informal, ad hoc
networks at one end to networks formalized through the creation of
international organizations, setting out their functioning in
multilateral treaties, on the other.148 Informal networks form when
regulators (or other key actors in civil society) meet and discuss
common problems on a reasonably frequent basis—for instance, in
the setting of international conferences.149 The regulators then have a
forum to exchange know-how and can then develop stable conduits to
improve their own respective regulatory responses to shared

147. SLAUGHTER, supra note 20, passim; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, America’s Edge:
Power in the Networked Century, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 94 (2009) (providing a foreign affairs
perspective); Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is
Domestic, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
LAW 110, 117 (Janne Nijman & Andre Nollkaemper eds., 2007) (explaining that a “critically
important tool in strengthening the institutions of national governments is the formalization and
inclusion of ‘government networks’ as mechanisms of global governance.”); Anne-Marie
Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 211, 219 (2006) (discussing the effectiveness of government networks); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated
Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1042 (2003) [hereinafter Slaughter, Disaggregated
Democracy] (discussing the relationship between networks).
148. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 20, at 48–49 (contrasting these two types of networks).
149. Id. at 49.
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problems.150 Formal networks, on the other hand, require diplomatic
negotiations involving multiple governmental departments to draft
and conclude multilateral treaties setting up standing administrative
bodies to coordinate the trans-boundary regulatory exchanges
between state members.151
Global governance networks differ from traditional forms of
international multilateral lawmaking. Traditional international law
making relied upon diplomatic conferences.152 States participating in
diplomatic conferences set out to negotiate ex ante the substance and
process to be included in a multilateral treaty in a manner akin to
contractual bargaining.153 States habitually relied upon their own
batteries of technical and legal experts to inform their diplomatic
negotiation positions.154 A diplomatic conference was successful if it
led to the conclusion of a multilateral instrument, the rules of which
would then apply prospectively, leaving only interpretive questions to
be resolved during the implementation of the treaty.155
Global governance networks replace this ex ante pre-commitment
device of ex ante multilateral treaties with regular engagement
between technical and legal experts in different jurisdictions sharing a
common problem. The goal of global governance networks is to
discuss and coordinate solutions to shared problems.156 To participate
in the network in good faith, network participants must accept that
they share a common problem.157 Their discourse is fruitful if they can
assess the regulatory experience of their peers and engage in critical
conversations about possible pathways to resolve their common
problem.158 Their discourse may at some point create the shared need

150. Id.
151. See id. at 63–64 (comparing regulators to the diplomats of old).
152. See Timothy Meyer, From Contract to Legislation: The Logic of Modern Lawmaking,
14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 559, 569 (2014) (contrasting the traditional role of a diplomatic conference to
bilateral prescriptive approaches).
153. See id. (comparing bilateral investment treaty negotiations to contracts).
154. See Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107 AM. J. INT’L
L. 334, 352 (2013) (“The Diplomatic Conference rejected appeals from some governments to
add economic and environmental crimes, preferring the list to include only crimes already found
in other international instruments or clearly understood to be predicate acts of crimes against
humanity under customary international law.”).
155. RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 71 (2008).
156. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 20, at 49 (using FINCEN as an example of governments
coming together to solve a common problem).
157. See id. at 250 (discussing the concept of positive comity).
158. Id.
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for the conclusion of a more formal agreement.159 Just as probable,
however, regular informal engagement between participants may very
well suffice to reap the coordinative benefits of network
participation.160
One of the consequences of global governance networks is the
explosion of governance through parallel tracks.161 Global governance
networks do not have a central global clearinghouse.162 Nor do global
governance networks necessarily rely upon domestic coordination.163
This means that global governance networks can exacerbate or create
conflicts within states when different administrative departments are
at odds with one another as to which agency has jurisdiction over a
certain set of problems. Thus, one might imagine that the energy,
interior, and environmental ministries of a country could be at odds
with each other as to who has authority to regulate power plant or oil
and gas production emissions. There is no guarantee that global
governance networks would cross these silos—and every chance that
competing networks could be formed.
2. The Relationship Between Global Governance Networks and
Transnational Legal Process
Global governance networks and transnational legal process
operate like flip sides of the same coin.164 Transnational legal process
thrives when there is robust engagement across national boundaries—
and the more multilateral the exchange, the more robust is the
exchange, interpretation, and internationalization of international
norms in domestic discourse.165 On the other hand, particularly
159. See Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–26 (outlining the formalization of discussions between
California and Canadian provinces).
160. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 20, at 250 (using the example of antitrust cooperation).
161. See Slaughter, Disaggregated Democracy, supra note 147, at 1042 (noting that
governance advocates rely upon governance “particularly through multiple parallel networks of
public and private actors . . . .”).
162. See Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 147, at 219 (“Networks combine central authority
and decentralized actors, at least when they are constituted, as they increasingly are in the
European Union, with a central node that functions as a secretariat and clearinghouse.”);
Stephen Zamora, Rethinking North America: Why NAFTA’s Laissez Faire Approach to
Integration Is Flawed, and What to Do About It, 56 VILL. L. REV. 631, 669 (2011) (noting that
some North American network clearinghouses exist but that more would be desirable).
163. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 20, at 49 (giving examples of networks that come about
even amidst a lack of domestic coordination).
164. See Waters, supra note 20, at 456 (discussing the relationship between global
governance networks and transnational legal process theory).
165. Compare Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 147, at 117 (noting the importance of
the growth of governance networks), with Koh TLP, supra note 11, at 194–206 (outlining the
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informal global governance networks function because the
engagement in these networks by participants from various
backgrounds creates the kind of stickiness theorized by transnational
legal process.166
The immediate consequence of this relationship is that global
governance networks create conduits for norm internalization. Global
governance networks internalize the problem solutions adopted by
other network participants as their own and self-impose limitations
upon their own choices.167 These solutions therefore become sticky
because of the underlying path dependence created by the continued
engagement by network participants with each other and their shared
interpretation of internalized norms.168
The central feature of stickiness through networked norm
internalization is reliance.169 Network participants act in reliance upon
the continued coordinative efforts by other participants.170 Global
governance network are premised upon the assumption that
networked coordination creates shared benefits for all participants.171
Shared benefits depend upon the honest and reasonable contribution
to the network by all participants. One participant’s failure to
contribute can create windfalls for that member from the efforts of its
peers. When this windfall imposes disproportionate burdens on the
remaining participants, serious disincentives of further participation in
the network arise.172 In the worst case, networks will fall apart and the
functioning of transnational legal process along similar lines).
166. Harold H. Koh, The Trump Administration and International Law, 56 WASHBURN L.J.
413, 446 (2017) (“What all of this again reminds us is that deals are sticky and global governance
regimes are path-dependent. As these regimes develop, they take on a life of their own—
building consensus about what set of norms, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures
should apply in a particular issue area. Intricate patterns of layered public and private
cooperation develop, and formal lawmaking and institutions eventually emerge. These patterns
create stiff paths of least resistance from which new political leaders can deviate only at
considerable cost.”).
167. See Koh TLP, supra note 11, at 194–206 (using examples of when nations have obeyed
international law to show the internalization of norms).
168. See Koh, supra note 166, at 446 (using the Iran Deal to show that deals are sticky and
global governance regimes are path-dependent).
169. See Frederic G. Sourgens, Climate Commons Law, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 885,
934–44 (arguing that the United States has certain legal obligations because of other countries’
reliance on its commitments); Frederic G. Sourgens, Supernational Law, 50 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 155, 184–95 (2017) (explaining that unilateral acts protect reliance interests).
170. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 20147, at 250 (discussing positive comity).
171. Id.
172. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and their Limits, 34
YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 125–26 (2009) (comparing the risk of opportunistic defection in the
regulatory context to the Prisoner’s Dilemma).
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benefit of coordination will be lost.173 Transnational legal process
describes the process that counteracts this potential for decay.
B. State Participation in Global Governance Networks
In light of the discussion so far, Koh’s statement that “norm
internalization goes all the way down”174 suggests that state officials
participate in global governance networks. More accurately, the
interactions permitted by global governance networks will
exponentially increase the opportunity for engagement and
interpretation of international norms by state actors.175 The statement
that norm internalization goes all the way down is practically more
meaningful to the extent that it could be established that state
officials in fact participate on a regular basis in global governance
networks.
State officials do in fact participate in a host of global governance
networks.176 These networks typically form in the same manner that
they do on the national level. They rely upon an exchange between
different subject matter regulators sharing in joint problems.177
It is on the whole uncontroversial that state regulators participate
in informal networks. Many of these networks form as part of
conferences or panel discussions. To give one recent example of such
an exchange, a 2016 panel discussion in Houston brought together the
oil and gas regulators of the State of Texas with their foreign
counterparts from Mexico and Brazil.178 Learned societies frequently
form one umbrella in which such exchanges can be further cultivated
through panel discussions and informally after sessions are
concluded.179

173. See id. (arguing that in light of disincentives, cooperation will break down).
174. Koh, supra note 9.
175. See Koh, supra note 135, at 2618 (“Through [an] interactive process, . . . law helps
translate claims of legal authority into national behavior.”).
176. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 277–89.
177. See id. at 280 (“virtually all of them have the same limited function – coordinating
activities by Border States in sharing information, resources or costs within a transboundary
region”) (quoting Duncan Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071, 1076
(2008)).
178. See The Inter-American Hydrocarbon Regulators Dialogue, U. HOUS. (Oct. 7, 2016),
http://law.uh.edu/eenrcenter/Inter-American/Conference.asp.
179. See The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. 38 (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/annualmeeting/pdfs/AM_Program.pdf (last visited Mar.
11, 2019) (bringing together Australian, Brazilian, Danish and UK officials to exchange on the
legality of use of force against non-state actors).
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State regulators further serve in formal global governance
networks. One such example is the U.S.-Canada Transportation
Border Working Group (TBWG). The TBWG is tasked with
facilitating “the safe, secure, efficient, and environmentally
responsible movement of people and goods across the Canada-U.S.
border.”180 The TBWG is a formal network created by an October 13,
2000, Memorandum of Cooperation between the U.S. and Canadian
governments.181 The TBWG importantly includes not just federal
officials from the respective governments of the U.S. and Canada but
also state and provincial representatives from affected states and
provinces such as Michigan and Ontario.182
The current conflict between the federal government and U.S.
states with regard to climate change suggests that states are willing to
take a more active part in more formal global governance networks
traditionally reserved to the national federal government.183 The first
meeting of the parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) following the statement of U.S. intent to
withdraw from the Paris Agreement is a case in point.184 The Paris
Agreement is a treaty concluded under the auspices of the
UNFCCC.185 The intended withdrawal from the Paris Agreement by
the U.S. thus created friction for the U.S. for purposes of the
Conference of the Parties meeting convened in Bonn following the
announced withdrawal.186
In part in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement, U.S. states sent delegations to the conference of the
parties meeting in Bonn.187 These delegations were larger than the
U.S. delegation—and far more vocal and supportive of the underlying

180. TBWG, http://www.thetbwg.org/index_e.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
181. Memorandum of Cooperation, TBWG (Oct. 13, 2000), http://www.thetbwg.org/aboutmemorandum_e.htm.
182. See TBWG Directory, http://www.thetbwg.org/about-directory_e.htm (last visited Mar.
11, 2019).
183. See Sloss, supra note 123, at 521–22 (discussing the increasing willingness of U.S. states
to form foreign state agreements in recent years in light of the Supreme Court’s Compact
Clause doctrine).
184. See Sourgens, Climate Commons Law, supra note 169, at 937 (discussing the “shadow
delegation” sent by U.S. states and municipalities following the Trump Administration’s
announced withdrawal from the Paris Agreement).
185. Id. at 901–02.
186. Id. at 936–37 (describing the protests by France, Germany, Italy, and China in
response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement).
187. Id. at 937.
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goals of the Paris Agreement.188 In fact, these delegations sought to
assure official delegates of continued commitment by large U.S. states
to the U.S. climate change mitigation goals expressed in the nationally
determined commitment.189
The reception of the state delegations evinces the fluid and
flexible nature of global governance networks. The state delegations
could not participate in the formal sessions reserved for official
national delegations.190 But the state delegations did engage in
exchanges with their foreign national on the back of the official
schedule.191 These delegations thus used official formal networks to
create an informal network in their shadows—and to communicate a
policy position that directly contradicted the position taken by their
national government in official, formal proceedings.192
In short, Koh’s observation that internalization goes all the way
down correctly identifies that state officials are active participants in
global governance networks.193 These networks tend to be more
informal than the formal networks created by multilateral treaties.
These networks nevertheless present the same opportunities for
exchange. Consequently, states have meaningful opportunities to
engage, interpret, and internalize international norms as a matter of
state law and state regulation. They further have meaningful
opportunities to do so in defiance of, and resistance to, federal,
national positions.
C. Resistance and Friction Between Global Governance Networks
The global governance network perspective speaks directly to the
issue under-theorized by the foreign affairs literature: the potential
for friction between state law and federal foreign policy, or resistance
by state law to federal foreign policy. As a matter of current affairs,

188. See id. (citing Lisa Friedman, A Shadow Delegation Stalks the Official U.S. Team at
Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/climate/unclimate-talks-bonn.html).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Koh TLP, supra note 12, at 206 (“[N]ations will come into compliance with
international norms if transnational legal processes are aggressively triggered by other
transnational actors in a way that forces interaction in forums capable of generating norms,
followed by norm-internalization. This process of interaction and internalization in turn leads a
national government to engage in new modes of interest-recognition and identity-formation in a
way that eventually leads the nation-state back into compliance.”).
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the ongoing conflict between states like California and other likeminded states on the one hand, and the Trump administration on the
other hand, highlights that global governance networks create the
potential for friction between a national government and state
governments.194 This conflict potential so far appears to be reasonably
binary: it could be cast as resistance by state actors (the delegations
from California and other states) against the attempts at defection of
a national actor (the Trump administration) from a global governance
network (the Paris Agreement).195
Such a binary view would, however, be overly simplistic because it
fails to capture that global governance networks create significant
friction due to resistance between networks beyond just the simple
defection scenario. The fact that states form part of global governance
networks therefore has significantly more far reaching consequences
than the Californian conflict with the Trump administration might at
first suggest.
The global-governance-network perspective thus permits one to
put a finer point on this phenomenon. The foreign affairs literature so
far has struggled with theorizing how conflicts between state laws and
federal foreign policy should be approached.196 The global governance
network perspective permits several conclusions that will aid in
gaining a better understanding of these conflicts.
First, the transnational legal process inherently and necessarily
creates friction across global governance networks. The transnational
legal process of norm internalization is situation dependent:
interpretation and internalization of norms is context-specific to the
situation in which a global norm was encountered (that is, the
“interaction” triggering it).197 Global governance networks, in turn,
define the parameters in which network participants encounter and
interpret norms.198 This means that the multiplicity of networks
194. See Oliver Milman, Paris Deal: A Year After Trump Announced US Exit, a Coalition
Fights to Fill the Gap, THE GUARDIAN (June 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/may/31/paris-climate-deal-trump-exit-resistance (describing the tensions between the
Trump Administration and resistant state governments and business leaders in light of the
Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement).
195. See id.
196. See supra section I.C.
197. See Harold H. Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture - Transnational Legal Process After
September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 339 (2004) (“Those seeking to embed certain
norms into national conduct seek to trigger interactions that yield legal interpretations that are
then internalized into the domestic law of even resistant nation states.”).
198. See Slaughter, Disaggregated Democracy, supra note 147, at 1042 (noting the existence
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invariably leads to a certain amount of substantive norm
fragmentation or divergence between different networks.199 Each
network interprets norms in light of their own specific problemhorizon or context.200 Consequently, each network (and a participant
within each network) internalizes these norms in a manner that is
highly context dependent. As context does not duplicate between
networks, divergence—friction—is pre-programmed.201
Second, with friction pre-programmed, the dynamics of global
governance network sustainability also lay the seeds for latent
conflicts between networks. The continued functioning of a specific
network depends upon the continued adherence of network
participants to shared norm interpretations.202 As the network
depends for its sustainability on this shared norm internalization, it
will naturally resist the external imposition of a rival norm.203 It will
do so irrespective of whether the rival norm is the result of nationalist,
mercantilist, or nativist jingoism or the result of a norm that is the

of parallel networks); Slaughter, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 20, at 49 (noting the
function of ad hoc networks).
199. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007) (arguing
that the fragmentation of international law reflects a dangerous, nonegalitarian system
undermining the integrity of international law); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther
Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004) (rejecting that epistemic communities in international law
could be governed by a market place of ideas); Stephan, supra note 22, at 1578–79
(“Privatization that destabilizes the domain of international law by making it less clear where
international rules apply thus produces high costs that require exceptional justification.”).
200. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 317 (Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall trans., Bloomsbury Pub. 2004) (discussing the fusion of horizons).
201. I am indebted with regard to this insight to Craig Martin, who formulated a similar
point as a critique to transnational legal process theory in the context of the jus ad bellum
discourse. See Craig Martin, Symposium: The Assumptions of Koh’s Transnational Legal
Process as Counter-Strategy, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 26, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/02/26/
symposium-the-assumptions-of-kohs-transnational-legal-process-as-counter-strategy/
(“But
such interpretation and internalization will only result in compliance with international law if
the interpretation itself is at least within a range of reasonable interpretations consistent with
established principles of international law. If the interpretation is outside of such reasonable
range, and moreover if it is a deliberate and instrumental effort to cloak or rationalize a
departure from international law, then it is difficult to see how the process will result in
compliance.”).
202. See Nathan Gibbs, Human Rights, Symbolic Form, and the Idea of the Global
Constitution, 18 GERMAN L. J. 511, 526–27 (2017) (discussing the nature of self-referential
discourses in transnational law).
203. See Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law?
Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 566 (2002) (highlighting the tensions between
jurisprudential approaches taken by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice).
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result of a rival interpretation and internalization from a competing
global governance network. Short of combining networks to
coordinate norm interpretations, in other words, resistance between
networks is just as probable to occur as conflicts with nationalist
“network deniers.”204
Transnational legal process and global governance networks thus
provide a means through which norm conflicts through the resistance
between networks continue to propagate. This is not necessarily a
negative. Rather, it reflects that value demands in any political sphere,
including the global sphere, are necessarily plural and, as such,
necessarily in some degree of competition with each other.205
The value added by switching from a traditional foreign affairs
perspective to a networked transnational legal process perspective
should by now be readily apparent. What appeared as a purely
political question in the foreign affairs literature—conflicts between
state legislators and the federal government—is now legally
cognizable.206 Transnational legal process and global governance
networks are legal phenomena subject to legal analysis. Placing
conflict between state law and federal foreign policy in this new rubric
of friction between governance networks thus permits a more
nuanced jurisprudential understanding of why and how processes
already theorized in legal scholarship result in conflicts that
previously had been considered to reside exclusively in the political
realm.
D. States of Resistance: The Topography of State-National Network
Conflicts
The switch to a global governance network/transnational legal
perspective allows a more nuanced view as to why and how different
kinds of conflicts between state law and federal foreign policy can
arise by focusing on the differing states of resistance between state
and federal network participants. As this section will show, not all of
this resistance is created equal. Rather, the dynamics of transnational
legal processes channel this resistance or friction along predictable—

204. See Stephan, supra note 22, at 1650 (outlining the danger of such competition for the
“preserv[ation of] clear and stable domain rules.”).
205. See Frederic G. Sourgens, Functions of Freedom: Privacy, Autonomy, Dignity, and the
Transnational Legal Process, 48 VAND., 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 471, 497–500 (2015)
(outlining the value of pluralist conceptions of transnational law in a process frame).
206. See Section I.C.
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and more readily ascertainable—pathways that can then be subject to
more nuanced legal analysis in their own right. To fully understand
the potential for resistance and friction inherent in treating states as
fully-fledged actors in global governance networks, it is therefore
necessary to map how conflicts could arise. This section proposes such
a topography of five potential states of resistance between state and
federal government actors consisting of conflict as: (1) a state check
on federal defection, (2) the use of states as allies in an ongoing clash
between multiple networks to which the federal government
contributes, (3) state assertions of interests through their own
autonomous networks in which the federal government does not take
part, (4) state defection from federal networks, and (5) differences in
amplitude of state and federal commitments to goals articulated in
shared networks.207
1. Check on Defection
The first, and most severe, friction between states and the federal
government arises in the context of the defection by either state or
federal participants in a network and the resistance to this defection
by the respective other actor. A complete defection occurs when the
federal government is a network participant in an existing network
and seeks to leave the network in question. This is typically the case in
the context of a change in administration following a presidential
election. The defection by the Trump administration from the Paris
Agreement is an example of such an effective defection from a global
network.208
The state government can act as a check on defection, that is, resist
it, by seeking to step into the shoes of the defecting federal
government. It would then seek to use its own legislative and
regulatory powers in order to meet network expectations. It would do
so in the face of contrary deregulatory moves by the federal
government.209
The state government in this scenario will also seek to continue
the engagement with other network participants. It will do so by

207. HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY 33 (1992) (discussing the importance of drawing up a “comprehensive map of
demanded values and of institutional practices by which values are shaped and shared”).
208. For a discussion of this defection, see Sourgens, Climate Commons Law, supra note
169.
209. See Popovich, supra note 2.
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seeking out opportunities for continued, typically informal exchanges
with other network participants.210 This effort can lead to
strengthened internalization of shared network norms in excess of
earlier federal commitments over time.211 In other words, the states
would continue to participate in the network in earnest rather than
simply maintaining a status quo. This continued engagement is
inherent in network participation and the continued engagement such
participation entails with fellow regulators. This engagement will lead
to new interpretations and internalization of norms that will then be
applied by states in their own regulatory processes.
The longer a defection conflict is allowed to persist, the more
pronounced the friction created by state resistance will become. For
instance, state governments in this case will continue progressively to
develop and apply international norms.212 The federal government, on
the other hand, sought to defect from these norms at an earlier stage
of development—and of ambition.213 This friction, therefore, can have
drastic consequences.
2. States as Allies in Friction between National Networks
A different state of resistance arises when state governments take
sides in ongoing friction between two or more networks in which
national governmental actors participate. In this scenario, state actors
will share in the same norm interpretations and norm internalizations
with some national actors but resist the rival norm internalizations of
other networks in which national actors also participate.
To the extent that a different global governance network conflicts
with the network in which state and national actors cooperate with
each other, the state regulators will become natural allies for the
affected national regulators. State regulation would shore up the
position of the national regulator and provide further cooperation
210. See Erik Kirschbaum, California Gov. Jerry Brown Delivers a Blunt Climate Change
Message in Germany, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fggermany-jerry-brown-climate-change-20171108-story.html (reporting on the California
governor’s tour to continue climate change mitigation efforts).
211. See Jean Chemnick, Cities and States Are Picking Up Trump’s Slack on Climate, SCI.
AM. (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cities-and-states-are-pickingup-trumps-slack-on-climate/ (a group of states “unveiled research Wednesday showing that
participants in the alliance are on track to meet or exceed their share of the Obama-era
nationally determined contribution to Paris, which called for a 26 to 28 percent cut in emissions
by 2025 compared with 2005 levels.”).
212. See id.
213. See id.
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across national-state divides. State legislators or regulators in this
context would contribute to an ongoing battle for competence
between different federal/ national agencies by resisting against the
proposed norm internalizations from the rival national network with
the promulgation of state laws or regulations.
Massachusetts’s so-called “Burma law” on closer inspection is one
such example that gained notoriety in the foreign affairs literature.
Massachusetts in 1996 passed a law boycotting companies doing
business in Burma, citing human rights concerns.214 The law was the
result of an informal participation by Massachusetts lawmakers in a
loose, broad human rights network.215 As one commentator noted, as
of June 2000, “twenty-four municipal, county, or state governments
had enacted selective purchasing laws specifically targeting Burma.”216
The actions by Massachusetts pitted human rights concerns—and
human rights networks—against free trade concerns and free trade
networks.217 Free trade advocates were quick to assert that the
measure was inconsistent with U.S. commitments made before the
World Trade Organization.218 By passing its “Burma law,”
Massachusetts, and other states and municipalities, became the
champion of human rights networks—and an opponent of champions
from free trade networks.
The U.S. Supreme Court eventually struck down the
Massachusetts law as standing as obstacle to national foreign policy.219
By the time the measure reached the Supreme Court, Congress had
passed its own law relating to sanctions on Burma.220 The Supreme
Court reasoned that the Massachusetts law encroached upon
discretion granted to the President under the federal statute because
the Massachusetts law stood as an obstacle to the execution of federal

214. Peter L. Fitzgerald, Massachusetts, Burma, and the World Trade Organization: A
Commentary on Blacklisting, Federalism, and Internet Advocacy in the Global Trading Era, 34
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2001).
215. Id. (describing a meeting between Massachusetts Representative Byron Rushing and
Simon Billeness, a key figure in the Free Burma Coalition, wherein the two discussed antiapartheid legislation).
216. Id. at 7.
217. See id. at 53.
218. Id. at 13.
219. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
220. Id. at 368 (“[T]hree months after the Massachusetts law was enacted, Congress passed
a statute imposing a set of mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma.”).
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Congressional intent.221 The Supreme Court thus took sides in the
conflict between federal and state action.222
Importantly, however, the resistance created by the Massachusetts
law and others like it was instrumental in bringing about a federal
program imposing different sanctions on Burma for its human rights
abuses. As Glennon and Sloane point out, “local actors at the state
and municipal levels took the initiative to advance values (e.g.,
political reform in Burma, international human rights protection) that
might otherwise have been marginalized.”223 Although the
Massachusetts Burma law facially failed (it was struck down by the
Supreme Court), its enactment had a lasting policy impact by
providing human rights advocates at the U.S. federal level with the
needed political urgency to adopt a federal program.224 In other words,
the insertion of Massachusetts into the friction between trade and
human rights networks—both networks to which the United States
belongs—created additional resistance against free trade norm
internalizations that materially moved the direction of U.S. foreign
policy towards the human rights network.
3. States as Source of New Network Conflicts
Friction can also arise when states enter into global governance
networks from which the national government is absent. Such
networks can form when one or several states confront regulatory
problems that are inherent in a particular environment. The overall
policy problems faced by the state government may very look
different from the policy concerns of the federal government and thus
lead to the creation of competing global governance networks.
One example of such a potential policy conflict is the Arctic. The
Arctic is subject to a national multilateral treaty to which the U.S. is a
party, the Arctic Council.225 At the same time, Alaska has established a
state-based commission to deal with Arctic problems, the Alaska
Arctic Policy Commission.226 One of the policy goals of the Alaska
Arctic Policy Commission is to “[s]trengthen and expand cross-border
221. Id. at 373, 385.
222. Cf. id.
223. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 299.
224. Id.
225. For a discussion of the formation of the Arctic Council, see Evan T. Bloom,
Establishment of the Arctic Council, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 712 (1999).
226. Final Report and Implementation Plan, Alaska Arctic Policy Commission (Jan. 30,
2015), http://www.akarctic.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/AAPC_Exec_Summary_lowres.pdf.
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relationships and international cooperation, especially bilateral
engagements with Canada and Russia.”227 This goal is separate and
apart from efforts to “[s]ustain and enhance state participation in the
Arctic Council.”228
The Alaska Arctic Policy Commission has already made
statements that, on their face, would appear to enter into traditional
areas of foreign policy and are inconsistent with federal policy at this
point. Thus, for reasons to do with rights to the Arctic codified in the
United Convention on the Law of the Sea—a treaty the United States
Senate steadfastly refuses to ratify—the Commission “[r]eiterate[d]
the state’s long-time support for ratification of the Law of the Sea
Treaty.”229
The entry into global governance networks by states, through
which states deal directly with their foreign counterparts to address
predominantly local problems, can lead to an internalization of
different norms from the ones internalized at the national level. This
can lead to norm conflicts particularly when the norms at issue at the
local level concern environmental regulations or matters pertaining to
cultural rights of local indigenous peoples.
4. States as a Drag on Creations of New National Networks
At the same time, friction can also arise when the federal
government enters into new global governance networks without the
states on issues that have strong implications for traditional state
regulation. In such instances, the new national or federal networks
will produce results that may well be at odds with the policy of state
governments—and with established global governance networks of
which the states form part.
In such instances, states may very well resist the full enforcement
of a global understanding. One example of this situation is the
enforcement of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.230 As
one scholar noted, “[t]he U.S. government considers consular
notification requirements to be extremely important.”231 The Vienna

227. Id. at 10.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
231. Anthony N. Bishop, The Unenforceable Rights to Consular Notification and Access in
the United States: What’s Changed Since the Lagrand Case?, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2002).

SOURGENS_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

132

5/15/2019 9:18 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 14

Convention in fact ultimately included a right to consular notification
and access in its Article 36.232 The United States actively continued to
remain involved in transnational legal processes relating to consular
notification obligations.233
Meanwhile, U.S. state law enforcement officers did not abide by
the consular notification requirements established in the Convention
and thus resisted its intended implementation.234 Paraguay, Germany,
and Mexico each brought claims against the United States under the
Vienna Convention before ICJ in cases in which Panamanian,
German, and Mexican nationals, respectively, were not informed of
their consular rights and subsequently sentenced to death in capital
murder cases.235 The ICJ found the United States liable and ordered
that executions not be carried out. The United States sought to
comply with the order.236 This result is consistent with the overall
international legal framework and global governance networks as
they were internalized at the U.S. State Department.237
Texas, in particular, resisted the attempt to have the order
enforced and pursued litigation on the issue to the United States
Supreme Court.238 Texas successfully argued before the Supreme
Court that the treaty pursuant to which the ICJ judgment was
rendered was not self-executing and that it consequently did not
benefit from the Supremacy Clause’s displacement of inconsistent
state law. The state in that particular instance successfully resisted the
imposition of new obligations through international legal processes—
somewhat to the chagrin of the U.S. State Department.239

232. See Vienna Convention, supra note 230, at art. 36.
233. Roberto Iraola, Federal Criminal Prosecutions and the Right to Consular Notification
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 179, 184–88 (2002) (discussing
internal state department and justice department interpretations of Article 36).
234. For a discussion of state law treatment of the consular notification right in Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention, see Alberto R. Gonzales & Amy L. Moore, No Right At All: Putting
Consular Notification in its Rightful Place After Medellin, 66 FLA. L. REV. 685, 712–15 (2014).
235. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 19–20
(Mar. 31); LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 446, 477–78 (June 27); Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisional Measure, 1998 I.C.J. 248, 249 (Apr. 9).
236. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisional Measure,
1998 I.C.J. 248, 256 ¶ 29 (Apr. 9).
237. See Iraola, supra note 233, at 184–88 (discussing internal state department and justice
department interpretations of Article 36).
238. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
239. See id. at 514–15; see also Janet Koven Levit, Does Medellin Matter?, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 617, 617 (2008).
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5. Potential Amplitude Conflicts within Shared Networks
The most common friction can arise when certain states disagree
with the level of federal commitment with regard to a global
governance issue that specifically affects the states in question.
California again provides a good example. As Professor Daniel A.
Farber notes, “the expansion of environmental law beyond the
traditional borders of federal environmental regulation is already well
underway in California.”240 As he explains, the California initiative can
be traced back to 2006 when Governor Schwarzenegger “signed into
law the capstone of the State’s climate policy, the California Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006.”241 This California initiative was
firmly embedded in global governance networks:
This law generated world-wide attention, including a statement by
the British Prime Minister that its signing represented a “historic
day for the rest of the world as well.” The Prime Minister and the
Governor of California also entered into an agreement to share
best practices on market-based systems and to cooperate to
investigate new technologies; similar agreements now exist
between California and states and provinces in Australia and
Canada.242

Action by California in 2006 does not represent a reaction to a
defection by the federal government from global climate networks.
The Bush administration continued to participate—anemically—in
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
proceedings.243 Although California’s action stands against the
backdrop of a U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, this
withdrawal was telegraphed unanimously by the U.S. Senate during
the Kyoto negotiations on the basis of distinct policy disagreements
on the importance of developing country participation in climate
change mitigation measures.244 In other words, California wished to do
240. Daniel A. Farber, California Climate Law—Model or Object Lesson?, 32 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 492, 497 (2015).
241. Id. at 493.
242. Id. at 493–94.
243. See Cinnamon Carlarne, Notes from A Climate Change Pressure-Cooker: Sub-Federal
Attempts at Transformation Meet National Resistance in the USA, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1351, 1361
(2008) (“President Bush’s climate change plan is based on reducing greenhouse gas ‘intensity,’
which measures the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to economic output. The initiative calls
for an 18 percent reduction in greenhouse gas intensity by 2012. Nowhere does the plan commit
to, or support, absolute reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.”).
244. See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 38 ENVTL. L.
REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10566, 10568 (2008) (citing the U.S. Senate’s unanimous adoption of a
resolution asking President Clinton not to agree to limits on greenhouse gas emissions if such
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more than the federal government on combatting climate change. It
did not wish to do the opposite.
In such scenarios, it is possible that the federal government would
permit states to act more aggressively than the national government
to meet policy goals through global governance networks.245 Thus, a
policy may fail for political reasons at the national level but, rather
than act to preempt state action, the federal government could leave
some implementation to the states.
It is similarly possible, however, that the federal government
would affirmatively seek to set a ceiling on the implementation of
global governance network goals.246 This may be the case because the
federal government is seeking to develop leverage for a broader
resolution of a larger set of problems, or it may be the case due to the
political commitment by the federal government to the global
governance network goals.247 But, in either case, the situation is
fundamentally different from an outright federal network defection as
the federal government would still, in theory, advance a good faith
position within the network with which the state government would
disagree.
E. Conclusion
The current conflict between California and the Trump
administration with regard to climate change mitigation efforts clearly
fits within the first category of states of resistance brought about by
state participation in global governance networks.248 California wishes
to safeguard U.S. participation in the Paris Agreement whereas the
Trump administration has both indicated its desire to defect from the
Paris framework and has taken steps to undo most if not all all those
policy initiatives that underpinned U.S. Paris participation.249 The
analysis of the current situation might very well fall prey to a variation
on the old adage that hard cases make bad law—seemingly easy cases
agreements would be detrimental to U.S. economic interests).
245. See Carlarne, supra note 243, at 1380 (discussing the importance of networked
coordination by states).
246. See id. at 1388–90 (discussing the resistance by the Bush administration to California
initiatives and the national political deadlock in which it took place).
247. See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 298–99 (discussing obstacle preemption).
248. See, e.g., Chemnick, supra note 211 (explaining the tensions between state leaders and
the Trump Administration and attributing to former California governor Jerry Brown the idea
“that the United States’ authority to make emissions reductions is decentralized, and
subnational actors will do much of the heavy lifting to achieve their country’s Paris targets”).
249. See id.
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can make bad law, too.250 On its face, President Trump’s defection
from existing U.S. international climate commitments exhibits the
kind of “intuitively sensed obviousness” of executive wrongdoing that
might well “induce[] a rush to judgment.”251 It would therefore be
easy to follow one’s gut and accept a legally convenient rationale for a
politically desirable result, thus supporting California’s action because
of a fundamental disagreement with the style and substance of the
Trump administration’s foreign and energy policies. This, however,
would simply propagate the problem already identified at the end of
the previous section: where one stands on issues of foreign affairs
powers appears to depend upon where one sits politically on any
given question.
The rubrics of states of resistances luckily have provided a far
richer theoretical toolkit with which to appraise this question. They
have made it possible to abstract from the particulars of a specific
dispute and identify core features of legal process that generate
conflicts between state law and federal foreign policy. This more
nuanced understanding of what previously were “political questions,”
in the colloquial if not in the legal sense, thus allows one to more fully
grasp “the internal coherence or future ramifications” of any one
approach to resolving the constitutional conflict between states and
the federal government.252
The rubric is also far more useful beyond the narrow
circumstances of today’s current affairs. Conflicts like the one
presented by the Trump administration have been reasonably rare. On
the other hand, conflicts that arise out of regime clash or
fragmentation of global governance networks, such as the clash of free
trade and human rights networks, or in the context of different
amplitudes of reaction within the same network, such as the clash
between California and the federal government on climate change
policy in the George W. Bush presidency, will become increasingly
more commonplace in light of the realities of globalization.253 Both
the arguments that states should be allowed to act as a check or
balance on federal foreign policy and the manner in which states
would do so look markedly different in this context.

250. O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 804 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See Section III.
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III. THE STATES’ CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO PARTICIPATE IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE NETWORKS
The Article so far showcases the difficulty for the foreign affairs
law literature to define precisely when federal foreign policy can
preempt state law. It reframes this problem through the lens of the
transnational legal process global governance network literature. It
shows how participation by states in these processes naturally leads to
the kind of policy conflicts that create problems for the foreign affairs
law literature, and it draws a more detailed map of potential types of
conflict between state law and federal policy than was previously
possible. But this still does not answer the broader question: Does this
switch in frame also permit more granular conclusions about the
constitutionality of such state action?
A. The Constitutional License to Network
1. The Compact Clause and Global Governance Networks
The foreign affairs literature provides an important starting point
for analyzing the constitutionality of state participation in global
governance networks. The literature so far has focused on the
instruments setting up global governance networks in which states
participate.254 These instruments typically provide for how state actors
will interact with one other, exchange information, etc.255 Global
governance networks form when states can interact with foreign
entities regularly, making this literature directly relevant to the
current inquiry.256
The starting point identified by the literature is the Compact
Clause.257 Thus, the Constitution narrowly prohibits the states from
254. See, e.g., Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–26 (discussing California’s climate action in
concert with Canadian provinces in the context of the Compact Clause); GLENNON & SLOANE,
supra note 16, at 277–91 (engaging frameworks for state-based cooperation through the lens of
the Compact Clause); Duncan B. Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071,
1076 (2008) (outlining existing state practice under the Compact Clause).
255. See, e.g., Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–26 (discussing California’s climate action in
concert with Canadian provinces in the context of the Compact Clause); Duncan B. Hollis, The
Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071, 1076 (2008) (outlining existing state practice
under the Compact Clause).
256. SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 20, at 49.
257. See, e.g., Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–26 (discussing California’s climate action in
concert with Canadian provinces in the context of the Compact Clause); GLENNON & SLOANE,
supra note 16, at 277–91 (engaging frameworks for state-based cooperation through the lens of
the compact clause); Duncan B. Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071,
1076 (2008) (outlining existing state practice under the Compact Clause).
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entering into treaties, alliances or confederations with a foreign
state.258 Further, the Constitution also prohibits the states from
entering into “any Agreement or Compact” with a foreign power
without Congressional approval.259 To the extent that the literature
has discussed the relevant constitutional provisions on the
permissibility of participation in global governance networks, it has
done so in the context of this second provision.
In light of these prohibitions, the key constitutional question is
whether global governance networks function like “any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power,” for which
states would require “the Consent of Congress.”260 Article I, section 10
of the Constitution distinguishes between “Agreement or Compact”
by context from “any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,” into which
states categorically may not enter by a separate prohibition.261 The
“Agreement or Compact” thus by context is something short of a
treaty, and therefore may be sufficiently broad to cover not just the
agreements setting up global governance networks, but also the
interaction taking part within them.
The early leading Supreme Court interpretation of the Compact
Clause confirms this broad interpretation of “Agreement of
Compact.” In Holmes v. Jennison,262 the Court interpreted the term
“Agreement” in the Compact Clause in the “broadest and most
comprehensive terms” to cover express and implied agreements. The
Holmes Court encountered the issue in the context of a habeas corpus
motion made by George Holmes, a man wanted for murder in
Quebec, who faced extradition to Canada pursuant to an informal
agreement between the governor of Vermont and a British Canadian
official.263 The United States Supreme Court in a plurality opinion
struck down even such an informal agreement as violating the
Compact Clause.264 It reasoned that an express formal agreement to
extradite persons in Mr. Holmes position between the State of
Vermont and British Canada would have been unconstitutional.265

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
Id. at cl. 3.
Id.
Id. at cl. 1–3.
39 U.S. 540, 572 (1840).
Id. at 541.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 572.
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Consequently, achieving the same result through informal agreement
should suffer the same fate. Thus, the plurality concluded:
[I]t was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to use the
broadest and most comprehensive terms; and that they anxiously
desired to cut off all connection or communication between a state
and a foreign power: and we shall fail to execute that evident
intention, unless we give to the word “agreement” its most
extended signification; and so apply it as to prohibit every
agreement, written or verbal, formal or informal, positive or
implied, by the mutual understanding of the parties.266

This on its face would apply to global governance networks.
Specifically, it would address formal agreements setting up these
networks. But it would also cover more: it would place informal, ad
hoc networks potentially within the scope of the Compact Clause.
And it would place interactions in the network within the scope of the
Compact Clause as well.
Problematically, as one commentator put it, “[o]ver time, this
passage was variously cited with approval, viewed as overruled, and
distinguished on the fact that the agreement at issue concerned
extradition.”267 In fact, Congress does not seem to have held up its end
of the bargain to police state conduct under the Compact Clause.268
Despite this apparent under-enforcement of the Compact Clause by
Congress, there nevertheless remains the specter that it could be used
in order to mount an attack on state conduct through global
governance networks, as Sloss has convincingly demonstrated in the
context of California’s climate compacts discussed above.269
2. Network Coordination vs. Compact Cooperation
This problem can be overcome by a careful reading of the Holmes
decisions through the lens of global governance networks and
transnational legal process concerns. Despite constituting the high
water market of the Compact Clause, Holmes significantly limits the

266. Id.
267. Fabien Gelinas, The Constitution of Agreement: A Brief Look at Sub-Federal CrossBorder Cooperation, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1179, 1183 (2006) (citations omitted).
268. Hollis, supra note 257, at 1078 (“Congress has refused its consent to foreign
participation in a compact exactly once - in the 1968 Great Lakes Basin Compact (and even
then only at the behest of a U.S. State Department concerned about conflicts with U.S. treaty
obligations). Nor has Congress ever challenged a U.S. state’s agreement as a prohibited
treaty.”).
269. Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–26.
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scope of the prohibition in the Compact Clause.270 Chief Justice Taney
was careful to circumscribe his reasoning prohibiting the informal
agreement between Vermont and British Canada. It was premised
upon the factual predicate that Vermont “acts not with a view to
protect itself, but to assist another nation which asks its aid.”271
In other words, Holmes is express that its prohibition is in “no
degree connected with the power of the states to remove from their
territory any person whose presence they may think dangerous to
their peace, or in any way injurious to their interests.”272 Chief Justice
Taney is explicit that “the ordinary police powers of the states, which
is necessary to their very existence . . . have never surrendered to the
general government.”273 The state, in other words, may always act in
its own interest.
The rub of Holmes is that “[t]he state does not co-operate with a
foreign government not [sic] hold any intercourse with it, when she is
merely executing her police regulations.”274 The prohibition, even at
its high water mark, requires some form of agreement that does not
immediately advance the traditional police powers retained by the
state.
The global governance literature suggests a new reading of this
case. Global governance networks rest upon the internalization of
norms and coordination of behavior efficiently to achieve these
internalized norms.275 Such networks do not rest upon traditional
notions of cooperation, i.e. the bargained-for-exchange of something
one oneself desires for something one is willing to give up to receive
it.276 Global governance networks thus act on a unity of shared
purposes, premised in shared internalized norms of network
participants, and not traditional frameworks of dovetailing interests
and the cooperative efficiencies they create.277
An example can help to illustrate this fundamental difference.
States at times offer tax breaks to multinational companies to relocate

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Gelinas, supra note 267, at 1183 (citations omitted).
Holmes, 39 U.S. at 569.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 569.
See Section II.A.
Sourgens, supra note 41, at 25.
Id.; see also ROGER FISHER, GETTING TO YES, NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 75 (3d ed. 2011) (discussing dovetailing differing interest in cooperative bargaining).
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their headquarters.278 When a state offers such tax breaks, it is not
acting on the basis of an internalized norm that taxing multinational
companies is wrong.279 The tax break is bargained for and in exchange
for the jobs and economic activity that the multinational company
would bring to the state.280 The multinational and the state are thus
cooperating in bringing new economic activity to the state.281 They are
not, however, coordinating their behavior through a tax governance
network.
This perspective is helpful for understanding the consequence of
Holmes for global governance networks. Holmes prohibits
cooperation by states without Congressional approval under the
Compact Clause. 282 In Holmes, this “cooperation” was the bargainedfor-exchange of the extradition of Holmes in implied exchange for
future reciprocation of some sort.283 This kind of cooperation falls
under the Compact Clause.
But Holmes undoubtedly does not prohibit coordination. Holmes
is clear that Vermont could have acted in good faith in furtherance of
its own police power in expelling Mr. Holmes from the state.284
Vermont could have coordinated with the Canadian authorities to
secure that Mr. Holmes would not re-cross the border into Vermont
after having been delivered to the Canadian border.285 Such
coordination would meet the Holmes test because the state would
simply have chosen to act on its own, ordinary, general powers in a
certain, otherwise permissible, manner.
In other words, the global governance perspective explains why
Congress has not exercised its oversight power in the vast majority of
apparent foreign state compacts.286 Most such compacts concern
coordination of behavior rather than outright cooperation between

278. See Che Odom, Tax Breaks Plentiful for Second Amazon HQ Even Without Bids,
BLOOMBERG (Mar, 26, 2018), https://www.bna.com/tax-breaks-plentiful-n57982090371/ (“Many
of the tight-lipped cities vying to become Amazon’s second home already offer incentives for
economic development that would provide the online retailer with millions of dollars in tax
breaks.”).
279. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 68.
280. Id.
281. See Che Odom, Tax Breaks Plentiful for Second Amazon HQ Even Without Bids,
Bloomberg (Mar, 26, 2018), https://www.bna.com/tax-breaks-plentiful-n57982090371/.
282. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 569 (1840).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 568.
285. Id.
286. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 284.
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states and foreign governments.287 Even Holmes, the high water mark
of the foreign Compact Clause jurisprudence, would suggest that
Congress has no authorizing role to play in this context. 288 The key
reason that states are constitutionally permitted to enter into global
governance networks is that these networks are premised upon the
exercise of existing regulatory sovereignty in the states.289 As the
exercise of regulatory sovereignty by the states deployed through
global governance networks is directed at immediately achieving a
permissible goal, the foreign affairs implications of their participation
in these networks, from a constitutional perspective, are secondary.
States are seeking to secure that domestic policies can, first, achieve
their desired ends at all and, second, better achieve them by
coordinating with foreign actors. States are seeking neither to engage
in foreign diplomacy, nor to secure cooperative advantages through
foreign engagements. They are instead enlisting the coordination of
foreign actors to achieve domestic policy ends.
What does this mean for our question, still left open in the current
literature, as to when precisely federal foreign policy can preempt
state law? Or inversely, what does it mean for state participation in
foreign affairs through global governance networks? It means that
absent Congressional or executive lawmaking action, states may
remain engaged in foreign affairs up to certain constitutional limits.
Centrally, Holmes stands for the proposition that states’ coordination
of their actions with foreign nations is permissible even without
Congressional approval so long as the states stay within the scope of
their traditional sovereign domain.290
B. The Limits of State Participation: The Role of Traditional Powers
The general constitutional permissibility of state participation in
global governance networks as such is only the first step. The
conclusion that states may participate in global governance networks
does not entail that every state attempt at participation will meet
constitutional muster. What, then, are the limits of state participation
in global governance networks?

287. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 280 (noting the broadly coordinating function
of most foreign compacts as to which Congress has not acted).
288. Holmes, 39 U.S. at 568.
289. Sourgens, supra note 41.
290. Holmes, 39 U.S. at 568.
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The Holmes distinction relied upon a difference between
permissible state coordination and potentially impermissible state
cooperation with foreign actors under the Compact Clause.291 This
distinction, discussed in the last section, assumes implicitly that the
state had the authority to regulate the subject matter at issue in the
absence of coordination.292 If the state lacked this authority, it could
not use global coordination as a means to expand its powers.
The more recent Compact Clause case U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Commission,293 addressing an interstate (as opposed to
a foreign) Compact, makes this assumption express. U.S. Steel Corp.
concerned the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC). Pursuant to the MTC,
the states had set up a Commission to promote uniformity and
compatibility in state tax systems.294 The state participants had failed
to secure Congressional approval for the MTC, leading to the
challenge.295 The U.S. Steel Corp. Court held that MTC did not trigger
the Compact Clause because the “pact does not purport to authorize
the member States to exercise any powers they could not exercise in
its absence. Nor is there any delegation of sovereign power to the
Commission.”296
It is thus possible to combine Holmes and U.S. Steel Corp.
Pursuant to Holmes, a state may coordinate its actions with a foreign
counter-party. U.S. Steel Corp. adds that states are simply prohibited
from invoking the network as justification “to exercise any powers
they could not exercise in its absence.”297
The question whether a state was entitled to act in the first place,
even in the absence of a global governance network, is a useful
heuristic. Its answer is not, however, a binary rubric. In many
instances, the actions of the state involve complex webs of regulatory
concerns that cannot easily be divorced from their global context. The
analysis thus risks becoming circular: states may act with regard to
matters impacting foreign affairs to the extent they have the authority
to impact foreign affairs. Any such analysis would beg the question, as
it would assume the authority it set out to discover.
291. See Section III.A.
292. See id.
293. 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
294. Id. at 456.
295. Id. at 454.
296. Id. at 473.
297. Compare id. with Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 568 (1840) (state action consistent
with police powers is permissible).
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Holmes again provides a useful starting point for this more
complex analysis. Thus, in the words of that decision, “[t]he state does
not co-operate with a foreign government not [sic] hold any
intercourse with it, when she is merely executing her police
regulations.”298 The closer the link between a state’s conduct and its
police powers, the stronger its claim to coordination through global
governance networks without requiring any Congressional approval
for its actions.
This concern for police powers as the limit of permissible state
conduct must be viewed in the historical context that gave us Holmes.
In this context, police powers denoted the role of the state “to take
care of the community more broadly.”299 Specifically, it required
keeping the public peace, providing for public health, securing the
means of economic prosperity, and protecting public morals within
the community.300 The state traditionally, in other words, may act for
the common welfare of its residents.301
This rubric of appraising state conduct through the lens of
historical police powers can make sense of the frequently criticized
decision in Zschernig v. Miller. As discussed above, Zschernig involved
an Oregon law that disqualified heirs from inheriting to the extent
that the laws in their home states did not effectively recognize the
right to private property.302 The case arose after the death of
Oregonians who had died intestate.303 The heirs of the Oregonians at
issue were East German residents who were prevented by the
Oregonian statute to inherit, leading the property to escheat to
Oregon.304 The Supreme Court concluded that Oregon impermissibly
encroached upon the foreign policy prerogatives of the federal
government by making value judgments about the desirability of
communism and the right to hold private property.305 The decision has
been heavily criticized in the foreign affairs literature for the reasons
already outlined in Section I. Importantly, it has also been treated as
298. Holmes, 39 U.S. at 568.
299. Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 745, 763 (2007).
300. Id.
301. Id. The state must stay within its zone of competence set out by the dormant
commerce clause. The concern here is, however, domestic, i.e. interstate commerce rather than
some additional scrutiny imposed by international commerce clause concerns. See Section I.
302. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
303. Id. at 430.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 441.
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inconsistent with current jurisprudence that is more permissive of
state action in the realm of foreign affairs.306 If Zschernig could be
integrated into a broader framework that could also yield permissive
results based upon context, it would thus be possible to provide a
theory that is descriptively more encompassing—a theory that
identifies aspects of jurisprudence that the current frames of reference
may not fully appreciate.
To make sense of this decision in the Holmes framework of police
powers, it is important to situate where on the police power spectrum
the Oregon law would fit. The short answer is that it does not fit at all.
The provision does little to nothing to protect the public welfare of
Oregonians. As the Clark decision reached earlier in light of
California legislation makes clear, states may in fact require
reciprocity from foreign countries in the probate context.307 They thus
may protect the rights of their own (Californian or Oregonian)
residents to inherit abroad by making foreign inheritance conditional
upon reciprocity and thus encourage foreign jurisdictions to permit
their own (Californian or Oregonian) residents to inherit in turn.308
The Oregonian provision barring inheritance on the basis of political
creed does little to advance this interest further.
As the law does not provide any tangible benefit to Oregonian
residents, this leaves the protection of public morals as the only
traditional police power reason for the Oregonian provision
preventing an Eastern German national to inherit on the basis of his
home state laws.309 But the existence of communist laws abroad does
not directly affect public morals in Oregon. To the contrary, any
attempt by Oregon to impose its public morals in East Germany
would violate the principle of sovereign equality that “[e]very State
has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and
cultural systems, without interference in any form by another
State.”310 The relationship of the Oregon law to traditional police
powers therefore is tenuous at best, and an internationally wrongful
intrusion upon sovereign equality at worst. It thus invites precisely the

306. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1918.
307. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 506 (1947).
308. Id.
309. See Legarre, supra note 299, at 763 (listing police powers).
310. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8082/Annex (1970).
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kind of functionalist rationale adopted by the Zschernig court.311 But
even Zschernig was not defined by this rationale but instead also
rested on a more traditional appraisal of state police powers.
This does not mean that the state may not act to give voice to
deeply held public moral commitments. The Crosby decision,
discussed above, in principle confirms that states have the power of
the purse to bar state entities from buying goods or services from
companies acting in jurisdictions that the state wishes to boycott.312
Absent affirmative obstacles placed in its way by federal law, the state
may follow reasons of public morals to spend its money as it sees fit.313
The decision in Garamendi also showcases that the state may have a
regulatory interest in demanding regulatory disclosures consistent
with its public morals-based goals.314 In both cases, it would be fair to
infer that state laws would have survived scrutiny in the complete
absence of any federal action. These decisions thus, intriguingly, are a
departure from both the rationale and language of Zschernig without
being necessarily inconsistent with its underlying operational logic.315
In short, the police power rationale for permissible coordination
by states through formal or loose global governance networks,
developed through a careful reading of Holmes, holds up against a
review of the key foreign affairs cases that have given the literature a
reasonable amount of difficulty.316 It highlights that this coordination
is always a matter of means and degree: no area of state conduct is per
se unconstitutional, even if certain means chosen by a state may well
stray outside of traditional police powers. States, therefore, may
participate in global governance networks as a categorical matter.
They are, however, limited by their traditional powers in coordinating
their actions consistent with these networks. Whether the means
chosen to coordinate their actions are permissible will require a
granular analysis of the law or regulation in application. And a
311. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1918.
312. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 367 (2000).
313. Id.
314. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 399 (2003).
315. See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1921 (“And while the Court in Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council held that Massachusetts’ sanctions on Burma were preempted
by the federal sanctions regime, some scholars immediately viewed the opinion as notable for its
failure to rely on exceptionalist arguments.” (citations omitted)); see also Michael Reisman,
Myth System and Operational Code, 3 YALE J. INT’L L. 230, 231 (1977) (defining operational
code as “the unofficial but nonetheless effective guideline for behavior” in contradistinction to a
myth system of the “norm system of the official picture”).
316. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 568 (1840).
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decision that one choice strays beyond permissible boundaries does
not mean that the state may not act in other ways to give voice to the
same internalized global norms.
C. Balancing Considerations
Not all state exercises of police powers are created equal. And
foreign policy decisions are not interchangeable variables. Rather,
state police powers and foreign policy decisions, respectively, exist on
a continuum. The jurisprudence reflects this basic, contextual reality.
On the side of police powers, the Court’s jurisprudence already
foreshadows skepticism regarding the more adventuresome state
forays into foreign policy. As discussed in the previous section,
Zschernig is consistent with the view that the tacit imposition of
Oregon public morals upon a foreign state was beyond the scope of a
state’s police powers.317 But Garamendi and Crosby, too, reflect a
similar attitude on the reasonable limitation of state authority.
In Garamendi, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) has the thinnest of
connections to California: on its face, it addresses claims accruing in
Europe;318 the underlying policies were issued in Europe between
1920 and 1945;319 and it reaches affiliates of companies currently doing
business in California, rather than only companies doing business in
California themselves.320 The regulatory interest would certainly have
been greater if the law concerned California policies or more directly
implicated California claims. As is, the current link of decades-old
insurance products to California appears more pretext than
regulatory necessity to secure the stability of the California insurance
market.
Similarly, in Crosby, while the state has an indubitable interest in
spending public moneys consistently with public morals, the inclusion
in the Massachusetts Burma Law’s boycott of products and services
provided solely on account of corporate affiliation seems to stretch
the police power rationale to the breaking point.321 It is certainly
reasonable that Massachusetts did not want to purchase products or
services that came directly from or through Burma (contemporary
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 435 (1968).
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 409–10.
Id.
Id.
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 382 (2000).

SOURGENS_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

STATES OF RESISTANCE

5/15/2019 9:18 PM

147

Myanmar). It is less reasonable to extend this concern to any products
and services simply because of corporate co-ownership of another
affiliate doing business in Burma.322
Conversely, both cases also involved areas in which the executive
traditionally has had significant foreign policy authority. Claim
settlements are a traditional subject matter for sole executive
agreements.323 They also lend themselves to a functionalist view,
borrowed from international law, that the national executive, and only
the national executive, can in fact release claims on the international
plane.324 The underlying concern in California’s regulation was that
Holocaust-era claims be settled fairly, as the name of the law already
implies.325 This concern thus shaded into an area traditionally reserved
to other actors.
Similarly, the question of economic sanctions is a matter of federal
concern, at least from a functional, if not from a textualist, perspective.
As one recent study argues, economic sanctions directed at foreign
states are the modern day substitute for warfare.326 This would suggest
a functional rationale to assign responsibility for such conduct to the
federal government—even if the historical novelty of the means
would fit only uneasily over the text of the Constitution.327 The forays
by states to try their hands at economic sanctions targeting companies
doing business with foreign states come perilously close to an
importantly federal domain.328
A balance of traditional state police powers against traditional
federal foreign affairs powers thus allows a clearer view of what the
jurisprudence actually does; such a view is also doctrinally consistent
with the Compact Clause. The weaker the link between traditional
police powers and state conduct, the more probable it is that the state

322. Id.
323. Harold Hongju Koh, Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking, 101 GEO. L.J.
725, 732 (2013) (discussing Pink and Belmont). There is an “exceptionalist” justification in
international law for this assignment of responsibilities as claim settlements are a traditional
area for executive commitments be it through unilateral acts or by means of the conclusion of a
treaty. For a discussion of why this exercise of authority is “exceptionalist” in the U.S. context,
see Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1915. For a historical discussion of unilateral actions
by the President, see Sourgens, supra note 41, at 22–34.
324. David Leys, Diplomatic Protection and Individual Rights: A Complementary
Approach, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1, 4–6 (2015).
325. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 409–10.
326. HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 36, at 388–89.
327. Id.
328. Id.
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is acting in a manner inconsistent with the federalist equilibrium. The
stronger the traditional federal competence with regard to the area in
question, the stronger the claim to federal supremacy. This means that
any action by the federal government that is not easily harmonized
with state law at the extreme end of the spectrum of both axioms
(traditional police powers vs. traditional federal competence) would
thus present an instance in which foreign policy would trump state
law. At that end of the spectrum, it would not matter whether the
federal government acted pursuant to an executive agreement (as it
did in Garamendi), acted in the scope of its foreign policy discretion
(as provided by Congressional legislation in Crosby), or acted to
reverse course consistent with its mandate.
The Court has been mindful of these broader realities its
treatment of state laws. It has not drawn bright line rules prohibiting
states from participating in global governance networks or
internalizing international norms into their respective laws. But
neither has it given states a blank check. Rather, it has weighed the
respective state and federal sovereign interests against each other in
demarcating the proper scope of state coordination and
internalization of international norms. Given the Court’s current
near-allergic
reaction
to
making
sweeping
bright
line
pronouncements, this is unlikely to change in the near future as a
descriptive matter.329
As a normative matter, commentators have submitted that such a
balancing test is undesirable. They argue that “[a]d hoc judicial
judgment based on particular factual situations would seldom be
susceptible to generalization. It would be difficult for state officials to
predict what would fall on one side of the line or the other, potentially
wreaking havoc on federal-state relations.”330 The transnational legal
process lens casts more than some doubt on this assertion. State and
federal officials are engaged in overlapping webs of global
governance networks.331 As network participants, they each answer to
the frictions created by the other—and frequently intend to do so.332
329. Dahlia Lithwick, The Supreme Court Is Not Going to Save You, SLATE (June 18, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/in-gill-v-whitford-and-benisek-v-lamone-johnroberts-supreme-court-shows-its-too-afraid-to-do-anything.html; Eugne Volokh, The Year of
the Punt, or At Least the Bunt, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 18, 2018 11:04
am), http://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/18/the-year-of-the-punt-or-at-least-of-the.
330. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 135.
331. See Section II.
332. Id.
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They are using policy tools strategically to advance their own norm
internalizations over rival norm internalizations.333
A balancing test is alive to the fact that the assertion of state
legislative power is a communicative act in this larger conversation.
As will become even more apparent in the next section, by balancing
state against federal concerns, a balancing test takes this exchange
seriously as a dialogue or conversation rather than exclusively
listening to one side. By considering both sides to federal-state
relations seriously, this balancing test thus protects these relations as
relations rather than imposing hierarchical norms that would make
engagement—that is, relationships—impossible. It thus again confirms
that while state participation in global governance networks is
presumptively constitutional, some of the results of state participation
may well not pass constitutional muster.
This balancing test, moreover, can explain another potentially
perplexing schism in the foreign affairs law literature. The foreign
affairs law literature currently claims both that there is an increase in
foreign affairs exceptionalism—the position that foreign affairs
decisions are constitutionally different from other, domestic matters
of constitutional concerns on functionalist grounds—and a trend
towards foreign affairs normalization.334 On its face, it would appear
that both literatures could not inhabit the same legal universe.
The balancing test for the appraisal of state conduct in global
governance networks oddly confirms that that both camps are correct.
Traditional federalism questions have increasing currency in decisions
applying facially to foreign affairs disputes precisely because
globalization has forced an ever-greater intrusion of “foreign affairs”
into our daily lives.335 As states have a role to play in setting their own
agendas in these areas pursuant to their traditional police powers,

333. Id.
334. Compare Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1897 (arguing that “the Supreme
Court has increasingly rejected the idea that foreign affairs are different from domestic affairs.
Instead, it has started treating foreign relations issues as if they were run-of-the-mill domestic
policy issues, suitable for judicial review and governed by ordinary separation of powers and
statutory interpretation principles”) with David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583 (2017) (submitting a reappraisal of exceptionalism in the immigration context) and GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note
16, at 300 (“[F]ew other issues [other than immigration] . . . as starkly pose one of the core
tensions within foreign affairs federalism.”).
335. See Jan Dalhuisen, Globalization and the Transnationalization of Commercial and
Financial Law, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 19, 21 (2015) (discussing the global trade implications
for everyday consumer goods).
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foreign affairs look a lot more like domestic affairs, as the literature
has noted.336 At the same time, however, the executive has become
ever more adept at using its own traditional foreign affairs powers,
enjoyed as a matter of international law, to drive policy, including
policy with significant domestic repercussions.337 This has given rise to
a justifiable impression of greater foreign affairs exceptionalism.338
Importantly, both trends currently co-exist and consequently cannot
be read apart from each other. Exceptionalism and normalization are
thus flipsides of the same coin, the difference between them merely a
matter of which perspective one uses to approach constitutional
balancing. The fact that both co-exist in the literature thus again
supports that a balancing test is the descriptively most apt rubric to
capture the current state of the law, pace the normative qualms raised
by some.
D. Framework Agreements
Professor Sloss places an important obstacle in the way of formal
state coordination through formal global governance networks and
state participation in transnational legal processes. He notes that there
is some support for requiring Congressional approval for state
compacts that commit a state to participate in a network for a fixed
period of time.339 He looks in particular to the Linking Agreement
between California and Quebec, which provides in relevant part that a
“party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving 12 months notice
to the other party.”340 Such a provision could not be revoked by the
state at its discretion.341 This would run afoul of the state’s “unfettered
power to withdraw” from the network and thus would again require
Congressional approval.342
The potential obstacle that Sloss identifies is important. The
agreements formalizing global governance networks frequently

336. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25.
337. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1253.
338. Id. at 1253–54.
339. Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–25.
340. Agreement Between the California Air Resources Board and the Gouvernement du
Québec Concerning the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, art. 16, CAL. AIR RES. BD. (Sept. 27, 2013),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/ca_quebec_linking_agreement_english.pdf
[hereinafter California-Quebec Agreement].
341. Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–25.
342. Id. (quoting Applicability of the Compact Clause to Use of Multiple State Entities
Under the Water Resources Planning Act, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 828 (1980)).
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include termination provisions intended to signal that the network is
not purely ad hoc in nature.343 If the inclusion of such provisions per se
would require Congressional approval, many formal global
governance mechanisms would be beyond the independent reach of
the states.
The first question, therefore, becomes whether the requirement
that Sloss identifies is otherwise consistent with the frame developed
thus far. Significantly, the jurisprudence Sloss relies upon is in fact
consistent with the coordination/cooperation distinction developed on
the basis of Holmes, in the foreign state compact context above, and
draws expressly upon U.S. Steel Corp.344 Sloss focuses in particular
upon a passage in U.S. Steel Corp. in which the Court held that “each
State retains complete freedom to adopt or reject the rules and
regulations of the Commission. Moreover, as noted above, each State
is free to withdraw at any time.”345
Given this overall overlap in the analytical frame between U.S.
Steel Corp. and Holmes, Sloss’s reading of U.S. Steel Corp. thus raises
the question whether a framework agreement setting up an otherwise
coordinative global governance network becomes cooperative in
nature simply by including a termination provision, like the
California-Quebec Linking Agreement.346 Luckily for state
participation global governance networks, this is by no means a
foregone conclusion.
In the context of the Linking Agreement Sloss analyzes, it is
central to understand the consequence of non-compliance with any
term of the agreement—including its termination provisions. This
consequence is spelled out in Article 18, entitled “Resolution of
Disputes.”347 This mechanism calls for consultations between the
parties “using and building on established working relationships.”348
Failure to abide by the termination provision does not trigger any
enforceable legal right under the Agreement.349 Rather, Quebec’s
potential complaint that California failed to coordinate is only fruitful

343. This was one of the reasons for such a provision in the Paris Agreement. See Sourgens,
supra note 41, at 111.
344. Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–25.
345. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978).
346. Sloss, supra note 123, at 524–25.
347. California-Quebec Agreement, supra note 340, at art. 18.
348. Id.
349. Id.
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if California wishes to continue to coordinate in accordance with the
dispute resolution provision in Article 18.
The dispute resolution provision thus ensures that neither party
bargained for the continued coordination by the other in exchange for
its own continued coordination. The Agreement works if, and only if,
all participants wish to engage each other. Agreements worded in this
manner would tend to pass muster under both Holmes and U.S. Steel
despite the exit provision precisely because states cannot be forced to
coordinate.350 Signatories of formal agreements constituting a
governance network, including state signatories, thus can include
provisions requiring fixed withdrawal periods so long as a failure to
abide by them does not give rise to justiciable or enforceable rights.
The exit provision in those instances is hortatory and expresses a
permissible desire to coordinate, rather than an impermissible
commitment to do so.
E. Conclusion
Where does this leave us? As a general rule, there is no
constitutional obstacle to state participation in global governance
networks. There is thus no per se obstacle to state resistance to federal
foreign policy through participation in global governance networks.
The balancing test pitting traditional state police powers against
traditional federal foreign affairs competence creates a more granular
perspective on how states may participate in foreign affairs. It also
creates a less clear picture of how or when they may do so and how
the federal government might respond to preempt or limit state
forays.
The balancing test drawn up through the global governance
perspective also leads to another surprising result. It possible to read
consistently jurisprudence that the literature has suggested is
incongruous. Principally, it is possible to account for the Supreme
Court decisions in Zschernig and Garamendi that are typically
associated with an exceptionalist view of the special nature of foreign
affairs questions, together with a view that is more permissive of state
participation on traditional federalism grounds in foreign affairs.351 It
is therefore possible to reconstitute a fuller picture of constitutional
tradition than was previously possible. The next section will lay this

350. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 473; Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 568 (1840).
351. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 25, at 1913.
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new rubric over the states of resistance in Section II to seek to
establish whether the state of resistance developed in Section II is
itself constitutionally relevant or predictive of how much deference
federal executive foreign policy (and particularly a foreign policy of
disengagement) will command in the face of inconsistent state law.
IV. REMAPPING NETWORK CONFLICTS
The Article so far has developed two rubrics to understand how
state entry into the transnational legal process creates resistance to
federal foreign policy. Section II outlined how states create different
types of resistance through their participation in global governance
networks. Section III outlined which constitutional constraints the
Compact Clause places on state conduct in global governance
networks. This section now combines both perspectives and asks two
questions. First, what are the preconditions for the states to be
constitutionally permitted to resist foreign policy? Second, what can
the federal government do to overcome this resistance?
A. Check on Defection
The most topical resistance by states to federal foreign policy is to
act as a check on defection by the federal government from global
governance networks. When may a state act as such a check on
defection? Section III has outlined that the state must have an
ostensible reason to legislate or regulate grounded in its own police
powers.352 It thus must act to protect the public safety and welfare of
its residents.353 Alternatively, it can attempt to use its spending powers
as a means to implement policy.354
In the context of California’s recent actions to challenge the
Trump administration’s announced defection from the Paris
Agreement, the first question is whether California has any
independent police power rationale to implement its own climate
rules. As a coastal state with a high population density and droughtinduced wildfires responsible for billions of dollars in property
damage, California’s interest in climate regulation is hard to write off
as pure pretext.355
352.
353.
354.
355.

See Section III.A–B.
See Section III.B.
Id.
Brian Clark Howard, 5 Key Threats to California from Climate Change, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 12, 2014), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/08/140812-
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This leaves the additional question: whether the federal
environmental law framework has preempted all climate regulation
by California. The answer again is “no.” By its terms, the principal law
at issue in preempting state environmental laws on climate change,
the Clean Air Act, does not preempt state action with regard to the
environment as a categorical matter.356 While the Clean Air Act grants
considerable discretion to a federal agency, the Environmental
Protection Agency, this discretion is not absolute.357 California thus
has regulatory authority and may exercise this regulatory authority by
coordinating with foreign states to achieve California’s goal of
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and thus protecting the welfare
of Californian residents.
This further leaves the question of how the federal government
can act nevertheless to preempt unwelcome state regulation resisting
defection. If the state regulatory interest has a relatively thin basis in
state police powers, a mere statement of foreign policy to exit from
existing mechanisms may suffice to stop state action under the
balancing test developed in Section III. By analogy to Garamendi, the
federal government prevailed on a mere statement of foreign policy
rather than preemption through an executive agreement.358 Such
policy statements should prevail irrespective of whether federal
foreign policy is to engage in greater cooperation with foreign states,
as was the case in Garamendi, or the opposite.
If the state has a legitimate police powers argument and its ability
to regulate a subject matter has been well-established, as is the case in
the context of the Clean Air Act, the federal government would have

california-climate-change-global-warming-science/#close.
356. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2018) (“Except as otherwise provided in sections 1857c–10(c), (e),
and (f) (as in effect before August 7, 1977), 7543, 7545(c)(4), and 7573 of this title (preempting
certain State regulation of moving sources) nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the
right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or
limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or
abatement of air pollution; except that if an emission standard or limitation is in effect under an
applicable implementation plan or under section 7411 or section 7412 of this title, such State or
political subdivision may not adopt or enforce any emission standard or limitation which is less
stringent than the standard or limitation under such plan or section.”). See also JJ England,
Saving Preemption in the Clean Air Act: Climate Change, State Common Law, and Plaintiffs
Without a Remedy, 43 ENVTL. L. 701, 733–35 (discussing preemption under the Clean Air Act).
357. Lisa Heinzerling, The Clean Air Act and the Constitution, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 121, 127 (2001) (discussing the Clean Air Act’s imposition of limits on EPA discretion in
the context of NAAQS).
358. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421, 424 (2003).
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to do more than express a policy choice.359 It would need to take
affirmative regulatory action either to preempt state law directly or to
regulate in such a manner that the state law in question is an obvious
obstacle to the attainment of the federal policy goal.360
In the context of defection, such regulatory action may require
additional legislation beyond the attempt by the executive to pass
preemptory regulations. To the extent that a prior administration has
committed the United States to internationally binding obligations, a
successor administration could only undo those commitments as a
constitutional matter if it had express authorization from Congress to
regulate in violation of international law pursuant to the Charming
Betsey canon.361 As discussed in the Paris Paradigm, federal law is
presumptively read so as not violate the international legal obligation
of the United States.362 An executive policy of defection that violates
international law thus requires express Congressional authorization to
be validly promulgated.363 An invalidly promulgated regulation
logically cannot preempt state law. The specter of defection thus raises
the need for further Congressional action to ratify executive foreign
policy.
B. States as Allies in National Network Conflicts
States have acted as allies in national network conflicts as
discussed in the Crosby example relating to Massachusetts’s Burma
Law above.364 The constitutional analysis developed above is helpful
in creating a rubric for how states can most effectively use their
powers to take sides in national network conflicts. Most immediately,
states must be careful to use an appropriate mechanism to take sides
in an issue that also involves federal interests directly. Thus, the
Zschernig decision makes clear that state laws that are grounded
fundamentally in public morals of the forum state, but seek to extend
those morals beyond state territory, will probably be struck down.365
State participation in human rights discourses, in particular, will

359. Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
879, 892–910 (2008) (discussing the constitutionality of state climate change laws and
regulations).
360. Id.
361. Sourgens, supra note 41, at 49–51.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 375 (2000).
365. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968).
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probably to encounter this problem. As the Crosby decision made
clear, however, the use of spending powers remains open even in
these scenarios to organize a boycott in a manner that passes
constitutional muster.366
The federal government has significantly more tools at its disposal
to react to state involvement in these instances. In the first instance,
Congress can pass an act to empower the executive to promulgate
policy on the area in question and implement a broader
Congressional mandate.367 This is what Congress in fact did in
Crosby.368 Such Congressional action typically will receive significant
deference even if it might, on its face, be possible to require
compliance with both state and federal law.369 This deference is
implicit in the fact that federal actors are already participating in
global governance networks—meaning that there is probably a
significant federal interest at stake. It is further inherent in many of
the functionalist concerns arising out of international law, because the
network conflict will have immediate repercussions on the world
stage and will potentially bring about international legal liability for
the U.S., as was threatened in Crosby.370
Additionally, the executive may be able rely on existing delegation
of regulatory powers by Congress.371 If the state has acted through
direct legislation rather than spending powers, the federal government
can simply seek to regulate the subject matter of state laws itself and
thus preempt state laws as inconsistent with federal regulations.372
This means that such conflicts will be a reasonably tempting field
to assert that federal foreign policy (and even federal foreign policy of
disengagement) can preempt state law. The discretion afforded federal
agencies in crafting a response to such national network conflicts will
be reasonably expansive. In both instances, however, it is important to
note that state laws cannot be preempted on foreign policy grounds as
such without any Congressional or administrative action. Rather, it
will take some further regulatory action to preempt by negative
implication, as was the case in Crosby, meaning that state conduct will
366. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372, 375.
367. Id. at 372.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1147–53 (2012)
(discussing administrative preemption).
372. Id.
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likely have met its underlying policy goals, namely to further
engagement by federal actors with the problem in question.373 A
policy of disengagement, in other words, must be clearly articulated to
be given deference.374
C. States as Independent Sources of Conflict
States can enter into independent global governance networks
and coordinate their regulatory actions even in the absence of any
federal participation. The key question for such legislation or
regulation will be whether the state can advance a plausible police
power rationale for its actions.375 If it can do so, the foreign affairs
impact of the state’s conduct will not of itself create an impediment.
The legislative scope of state action at issue in Crosby and Garamendi
further indicates that state police powers will be broadly understood
for purposes of the Compact Clause analysis.376
The federal government is not powerless to act in overcoming
such new and independent conflicts. By their nature, however, these
independent networks may well fall more squarely in the realm of
traditional state police powers. This will mean that federal action will
need to overcome a higher burden to preempt state law passed
consistently with such independent networks. This, thus, is one area in
which federal foreign policy probably will not preempt state law; it is
even less probable that a federal foreign policy of disengagement
would be able to achieve this end.
In this regard, independent state networks invert the scenario in
which states act as a drag on new national networks. To overcome
cooperative endeavors, it may well be necessary for Congress to act
with sufficient specificity to preempt state law. Congress further will
have to act within its enumerated powers. Such coordination, in other
words, may be the most difficult for the federal government to
overcome or enjoin simply because these independent state networks
are the most likely to implicate core state responsibilities and more
tangential federal responsibilities.
United States v. Bond377 may be a case in point. The issue in Bond
was the Convention on Chemical Weapons and the Chemical
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372, 375.
Id. at 372.
See Section III.B.
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 375; Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421, 424 (2003).
572 U.S. 844 (2014).
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Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998.378 Bond involved a
federal prosecution, pursuant to the Chemical Weapons
Implementation Act of 1998, of a micro-biologist who had used an
arsenic-based compound to attempt to poison her friend for sleeping
with her husband.379 The Roberts court in Bond ruled that the
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 could be
not be read to upset “the constitutional balance between the National
Government and the States.”380 Consequently, the use of the Chemical
Weapons Implementation Act of 1998 to prosecute “traditionally local
criminal conduct” would be an unreasonable extension of the
statute.381
Centrally, the Court ruled that “the background principle that
Congress does not normally intrude upon the police power of the
States is critically important. In light of that principle, we are reluctant
to conclude that Congress meant to punish Bond’s crime with a
federal prosecution for a chemical weapons attack.”382 This conclusion
can be applied, one-to-one, to the creation of global governance
networks by the states in areas that fall squarely within “the police
power of the States.”383 In this area, there would be a presumption
against Congressional authorization for federal action.384
This presumption against Congressional authorization mirrors the
presumption against a violation of a different international order by
Congress. The Court announced a presumption in the Charming
Betsey case that Congress is presumed not to authorize the United
States to violate international law.385 The Charming Betsey canon
allows that Congress may enact a law that violates international law if
it does so clearly.
This presumption may well be read after Bond to apply similarly
to Congressional action that would violate the traditional boundaries
between state and federal responsibility.386 Congress has the power to
do so in one particular circumstance outlined in Missouri v.

378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Id. at 848.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 862.
Id. at 863.
Id.
Id. 863.
Id.
Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
Bond, 572 U.S. at 863.
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Holland.387 It can ratify and implement a treaty pursuant to the
necessary and proper clause of the Constitution and thus supersede
traditional state police powers by passing legislation ancillary to the
treaty power.388 The point of Bond is that implementing legislation
will be read to do so only if the legislation overcomes the presumption
in question.389
The same presumption was at issue in Medellin v. Texas.390 There,
the federal government sought to set aside capital murder convictions
on the basis of a judgment by the ICJ ruling that Texas (that is, the
United States) failed to abide by the terms of the Vienna Consular
Relations Convention.391 As discussed above, the Court determined
that the treaty obligations did not displace Texas law as they were not
self-executing.392 Centrally, the Medellin court implicitly applied the
same presumption that would later be articulated in Bond: federal
action to displace state police powers would need to be clearly
articulated in appropriate implementing legislation by Congress.393
This means that ultimately states are at their most secure when
they act pursuant to their police powers in independent global
governance networks (after all, the federal government has no reason
to join those networks). They similarly act at their most secure when
resisting federal foreign policy that encroaches upon traditional state
powers. These conflicts most clearly align constitutional and global
governance networks rubrics. They are thus the areas in which states
may provide the most unfettered resistance to federal foreign policy—
and to federal law.
D. Amplitude Conflict and Preemption
This leaves amplitude conflicts between states and the federal
government. These conflicts in many ways leave states in their
weakest position. They involve state resistance to existing federal law
or regulation. Such conflicts thus directly trigger preemption concerns
because, by definition, the federal government has already
promulgated rules or passed legislation regarding the subject matter

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Id.
Bond, 572 U.S. at 863.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525–32 (2008).
Id.
Id.
Id.; Bond, 572 U.S. at 863.
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of state law or regulation.394
Such conflicts will ultimately turn on a comparison of the
respective regulatory interests as well as the clarity with which
Congress has preempted state laws or regulations in question.395 If the
federal government has acted in a constitutional manner, federal
interests will, by definition, be well-established, because it would have
acted pursuant to its constitutional powers.396 This would leave the
question: does the authorizing statute at issue carve out a role for
consistent state legislation?397 If it does, the state legislation or
regulation further would have to be compared with the overall
purpose of the federal statutory regime. A true amplitude challenge—
one in which the federal government intended to halt at a certain
regulatory measure—would therefore have a difficult road to travel.
Amplitude challenges are likely to result in preemption of state
law on the basis of federal foreign policy—even a policy of
disengagement. Absent a clear statutory authorization for states to
impose standards independent from federal regulation, federal policy
will likely receive deference.398 This deference applies both to
regulation actually promulgated by the federal government and
regulation that has not been implemented as a policy tool.399
Administrative preemption and other federal administrative policy
tools, in other words, are likely to swallow amplitude conflicts due to
administrative delegation doctrine.400
An amplitude challenge can still play an important role in
generating policy debate. Even in this context, federalism challenges
typically occur after the state law or regulation has been
promulgated.401 This means that the merits of the state regulation—
and the nature of its tailoring to meet specific traditional state police
powers concerns—would have to be litigated. Such litigation will

394. See Section II.
395. See Section III.C.
396. U.S. CONST. art I.
397. As discussed, the Clean Air Act does so in important respects. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2018).
398. See Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 637 (2014)
(“Federalism values can be considered effectively, and with fewer negative consequences, in the
more encompassing reasonableness analysis that courts perform in the ordinary two steps of the
Chevron framework, and in arbitrary and capricious review.”).
399. See id. at 648 (outlining how federal agencies can curb state discretion through
preemption and other tools).
400. Id. See also Rubenstein, supra note 371, at 1147–53 (discussing administrative
preemption).
401. See Rubenstein, supra note 371, at 1147–53 (discussing administrative preemption).
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highlight sensitive policy concerns as well as create a record for future
administrative rulemaking procedures. Even a doomed state foray
may thus keep alive a policy discourse in ways that will affect future
rule making by federal authorities.
E. Conclusion
The states of resistance mapped in Part II each fit differently over
the constitutional rubrics developed in Part III. In combination, the
transnational legal process literature and the Compact Clause
jurisprudence develop a coherent theory of how states can act as
constituent participants in transnational legal processes.402 This theory
can answer the question left open by the existing literature: whether a
federal foreign policy of disengagement can preempt state law and
policy of global engagement through global governance networks.
This answer is nuanced and takes into account the different types
of resistance and the relative interests of states and federal actors in
pursuing their respective policies. It further depoliticizes the foreign
affairs rubrics from the specifics of the underlying state law at issue
and thus provides a meaningfully value neutral means to appraise the
state-federal government conflict. Finally, it provides a further
analytical means to drill down deeper into the foreign affairs
jurisprudence and find surprising dynamics of continuity across
seemingly inconsistent case law. It thus can make sense of when and
how the federal government will receive significant deference for
policy statements to overcome state law, while at the same time
making sense of instances in which even implementing legislation
passed by Congress under its treaty powers will not upset settled state
law in other regards.
The Article so far does more than answer the original question of
whether foreign policy—particularly a negative foreign policy of
disengagement—can preempt inconsistent state law. It provides a map
of state participation in the dynamics of global life. This is important.
In the words of Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman,
The internal process of decision is affected by the complexities of a
division of institutional practice that strikes a variable balance
between territorial centralization and decentralization, and
degrees of pluralization. The bureaucratic and coalitional nature of

402. Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, & W. Michael Reisman, The World
Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 262 (1967).
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contemporary society and government permits the development of
subloyalties and idiosyncratic value goals in different sectors of
society and departments of government.403

States are truly constitutive actors on the international stage. They
fulfill an important role and have a significant amount of autonomy in
transnational legal discourses. The map developed so far is a sketch of
just these complexities and balances. It shows that states act as a
check of federal power in foreign affairs and can serve as both a
negative check and a positive impetus for U.S. participation in global
affairs. It also outlines the limits of this power and the manner in
which these limits create independent dynamics for global governance
that have not so far been fully theorized. This leaves the question of
whether these dynamics have independent value and, if so, what this
value is.
V. THE CONSTITUTIVE VALUE OF STATES OF RESISTANCE
In the current political climate, it is tempting to think that the
value of state participation in global governance networks is to act as
a guardian of last resort.404 As this final part will outline, this is
certainly one important value of state participation in global
governance networks. It is, however, not the most transformative
aspect of introducing states as constitutive actors on the global stage.
Rather, the core value that states play is to provide a means to apply
transnational legal process to competing global governance networks
within a single polity.
This core value of state participation has two momentous
consequences. In the first instance, it creates instances of
confrontation and engagement with and between the diverse values of
global governance networks within a single polity. It thus creates new
opportunities for the transnational legal process to function outside of
a single global governance network.405 Second, the presence of
irritants or states of resistance to dominant understandings of
transnational legal process within a national community also serves a
broader integrating role for transnational legal processes themselves.

403. Id. at 263–64.
404. Koh, supra note 9.
405. Koh, supra note 135, at 2618.
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A. Inverting the Rule of Exception: States as an Antidote to Executive
Control
Much ink has been spilled on the increasingly aggressive role
played by the President in making international law around Congress.
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, in particular, in a recent article
submitted that the Executive, and particularly the President, had
assumed too great of a control over international lawmaking
processes.406 Part of this argument is a direct consequence of the
partisan gridlock in Congress, which would make it nearly impossible
for a president to command the supermajority needed in the Senate
(and depending upon the international lawmaking enterprise, in the
House of Representatives) to follow ordinary constitutional processes
for international lawmaking.407
As the contemporary political environment so frequently invites
comparisons to late 1920s and early 1930s Germany, this inability of
democratic processes to function would conjure up the picture of
executive rule-by-decree by the German Reichspresident and the
eventual demise of democratic processes altogether.408 The arrogation
of previously legislative power by the executive thus has worrying
precedents in recent history.
These worrying precedents have a common intellectual father in
Carl Schmitt.409 Schmitt was the leading legal apologist for the
increasingly dictatorial regime in Germany at the end of the Weimar
Republic and into the Third Reich.410 Drawing in part on German
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, Schmitt focused on the point of
decision and argued that decision is ultimately dictatorial in the sense
that some one person or entity must decide.411 Schmitt sought to prove
this dictatorial nature of constitutional decisionmaking by focusing on

406. See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26.
407. See id. at 1260 n. 273 (relating the literature on the desirability of presidential action to
theories about administrative action in light of Congressional gridlock).
408. See Howard Wasserman, When the Nazis Became “The Nazis,” PRAWFSBLAWG (June
23, 2018 at 11:05 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/06/when-did-the-nazisbecome-the-nazis.html (drawing the Trump/ National-Socialist comparison); Aziz Huq & Tom
Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78, 93 (2018) (outlining
the Weimar threat).
409. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, THE RISE AND
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 413–94 (2001) (discussing Schmitt in the context of
his intellectual tradition).
410. Id. at 430.
411. Adam Thurschwell, Specters of Nietzsche: Potential Futures for the Concept of the
Political in Agamben and Derrida, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1193, 1219 (2003).
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states of exception or emergency.412 He submitted that all
constitutions ultimately could be boiled down to this exceptional or
emergency rule precisely because those moments identified who the
one person with final decisional authority in a political system is.413
The exception thus is not an isolated emergency but the foundational
norm upon which an entire constitutional system stands.414
If one were to follow the Schmittian analogy to the end, the
arrogation of foreign affairs powers by the executive identified by
Bradley and Goldsmith reveals a moment of exception.415 The
Presidency holds exceptional power, particularly when all other
means of legal engagement fail due to gridlock.416 The Presidency, in
Schmittian terms, thus has quasi-dictatorial powers beyond domestic
constitutional review to act on the global stage.417
The arrival of states on the global stage, particularly in exceptional
moments of federal defection from global governance networks, puts
a significant damper on this conception of executive power.418
Contrary to the Schmittian dictator, executive decision remains
vulnerable to challenge and further litigation in the federal courts and
deliberation in state and federal administrative agencies.419 The
Presidency, therefore, does not have the last word or ultimate
decisionmaking power at all.
Interestingly, the availability of outright state resistance in the face
of (some) federal defection from global governance networks again
empowers Congress.420 If we follow Schmittian analysis of placing the
power of decision in the body that ultimately must cut through the
knot of indecision, the analysis outlined in this Article clearly points
to Congress as the only body able to do so.
The arrival of states as a counterweight to the federal executive
therefore achieves organically what Bradley and Goldsmith seek to
advocate by means of reform proposals: the return of Congress as the

412. CARL SCHMITT, POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE 42 (1934).
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1260. Notably, Bradley & Goldsmith argue
against this rationalization of presidential powers but nevertheless provide a powerful
descriptive account of its apparent use.
416. Id.
417. SCHMITT, supra note 412, at 42.
418. See Section IV.A.
419. SCHMITT, supra note 412, at 42.
420. See Section IV.A.
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ultimate democratic decisionmaking organ even in matters of foreign
affairs.421 Until Congress acts, the resistance by states is an important
retardant of federal executive action that subjects federal executive
action to the same kind of political forces of electoral gridlock
affecting Congress.422 State participation in global governance
networks and the states of resistance they can generate therefore go a
long way towards defusing the specter of Schmittian foreign affairs
decisionalism conjured in the literature.
B. Creating Engagement – States of Resistance as Instances of ReInterpretation
So far, the value of state participation in global governance
networks appears limited to playing a spoilsport to executive
overreach. Though meaningful in Schmittian terms, this would
ultimately relegate the role of states to one of merely metaphysical
importance. Exceptions, after all, are exceptional and thus not the
ordinary concern of legal and policy process, pace the current
administration.
It is therefore important to map what value the irritant of state
participation in global governance networks plays in ordinary times
when the federal government does not seek to defect from existing
commitments. As outlined in Section II, state participation in global
governance networks is not limited to instances of defection. Rather,
it is a constant companion of participation by states in networks
different from those in which the federal government participates. It
thus creates a constant drag on federal policy even when federal
policy is aimed at international cooperation.
In these ordinary situations, state participation in global
governance networks and the softer resistance to federal policy is
more valuable than the states’ exceptional checking power. State
resistance creates moments of engagement between federal and state
lawmakers, as Crosby so amply demonstrated.423 This engagement
takes the form of legal argument in litigation—but it also takes the
form of mutual engagement in legislative, or in some instances noticeand-comment, procedures.424 These moments of engagement expose

421.
422.
423.
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Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 1270–97.
See Section IV.
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000).
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 16, at 299.

SOURGENS_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

166

5/15/2019 9:18 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 14

each state and federal lawmaker to the norms and values that at core
motivate the other’s law or rule.
This exchange within existing policy processes replicates
transnational legal process.425 It requires all actors to interpret the
respective submissions upon which resistance is based.426 The federal
government will interpret state submissions, state governments will
interpret federal submissions, federal courts will weigh these
submissions against each other, and so on. This process does more
than result in an ultimate decision as to which policy the United
States will follow with regard to a disputed measure. It showcases that
there are additional values that must be taken into account when
addressing policy questions at issue in global governance networks.427
The fact of interpretation of the various submissions significantly
leads to an internalization of the heterodox values that inform parallel
global governance networks in the respective other global governance
network.428 Each participant in a global governance network will take
the input from its engagement with the respective other network back
to the other network participants.429 This in turn will cause an
opportunity for interpretation to all network participants,430 which in
turn creates a diffusion of interpretation and norm internalization
brought about by resistance within the U.S. constitutional system.431 In
other words, a decision by a federal district court that a state and
federal policy should continue side-by-side because they are
consistent measures not preempted by federal legislation will inform
policymaking outside the U.S. because federal and state participants
in their respective networks will report on this result and its
motivation. The networks in turn will grapple with the finding of
consistency—and whether they wish to embrace and internalize it or
resist it further.
Resistance within one polity to the results of global governance
networks on the basis of other such networks thus forces engagement
between these networks.432 The conflict potential inherent in state
425.
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427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.

Koh, supra note 135, at 2602.
Id. at 2618.
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Id.
Id.
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See generally GRALF PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS,
RUNNING CODE (2010).
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participation in global governance networks therefore is a net good in
further diffusing transnational legal values. It diffuses these values in
the U.S. by exposing more policy makers to international norms they
would otherwise have missed. These norms will in turn be internalized
through interpretation, further strengthening the effects of the
transnational legal process in fostering international norm compliance
and cooperation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has been able to outline a new rubric of why and how
states not only may participate in global governance networks but
also may actively resist federal foreign policy. The Article has done so
while also reconciling key cases that were traditionally considered to
be incongruous with each other. It thus has provided a detailed
predictive tool for how states could align their action in the future to
maximize the effectiveness of their participation in global affairs.
The Article has also pointed out that this participation by states
creates an important value both in the U.S. and beyond by creating
interfaces between different global governance networks. The
interfaces created between different global governance networks by
state resistance serve a broader purpose for international regimes.
One of the inherent problems for global governance networks is that
they tend to fragment the global normative landscape.433 Each
network generates its own context dependent norms.434 These norms
differ from the norms generated in other networks.435 These norms
can frequently be inconsistent with each other.436 And there is
ultimately no means of determining which norm is “correct,” as doing
so would divorce norms from context in a manner that is made
impossible by the global governance network infrastructure itself.
States of Resistance provides a model of how these conflicts can
nevertheless be resolved without the need for creating a hierarchy of
networks.437 States can cause these different networks to engage each
other and thus provide a means for the transnational legal process to
work between transnational legal processes. This solution suggests that
a flat engagement between different processes is indeed possible—

433.
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435.
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437.

Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 199, at 1005.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“If anywhere, it is here that the notion of a ‘clash of cultures’ is appropriate.”).
SLAUGHTER, supra note 20, at 132.
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and that the work to comprehend how this engagement takes place
critically depends upon a proper understanding of frequently
overlooked constitutive actors in world society.

